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HC140.P7 B39 2010 Abstract 
 
While Mexico has potential to grow rapidly, its economic growth has remained 
low for the past three decades. There is no consensus on the country’s 
development path or on how to achieve specific goals. Since the policy debate 
remains ideological and lacks pragmatism, productive development policies 
(PDPs) are often uncoordinated, redundant or even incongruent with each other. It 
is therefore important to understand the process whereby PDPs are designed and 
the institutional setting in which they are are implemented. This paper 
consequently examines whether PDPs respond to market failures and/or 
government failures. When PDPs are not designed to address specific market 
failures they can produce unwanted results or prove completely ineffective. When 
PDPs do address government failures, it is important to determine the reasons 
why the failure cannot be corrected in the first place and whether PDPs will be 
effective at addressing the problem in a second-best manner.  
 
JEL Classifications: O25, O43 




1 1. Introduction: A Story of Low Economic Growth and Stalled Productivity 
 
Mexico has great potential for accelerated growth. It is among the 20 countries that, according 
the World Bank’s World Development indicators, account for 80 percent of world GDP (World 
Development Indicators), and it has the world’s ninth-largest oil reserves and third-largest 
quantity of fresh water resources. Mexico further enjoys a demographic bonus and shares its 
border with the largest economy in the world, and has signed commercial treaties that include 
over 42 countries. 
However, economic growth has remained low for the past three decades. The structural 
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s led to the stabilization of the macroeconomic environment, with 
low levels of inflation, balanced budgets, and positive growth rates. Policies that promoted 
openness were also implemented with varied degrees of success during this period, and the 
political transition that began in the mid-1990s—which ended 71 years of one-party rule—
created created a historical opportunity to transcend the mistakes of the past and move toward a 
high-growth era. Yet, neither openness nor macroeconomic stability has proven sufficient to 
promote productivity increases in the country’s firms. As shown in Figure 1, Mexico fares poorly 
with respect to other regions in terms of productivity growth. 
 
Figure 1. Total Factor Productivity Growth for Various Regions and Mexico 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, Growth Accounting, 2008. 
 
  2Mexico’s experience is closely related to that of other countries in Latin America, where 
an onerous regulatory environment, little attention to microeconomic reforms, and the existence 
of higher competitive barriers than in other countries, has slowed the process of productive 
transformation for the region (CAF, 2006). Mexico has liberalized its economy and achieved 
macroeconomic stability, two key conditions for promoting firms’ competitiveness. 
Microeconomic conditions, however, are still deficient: multiple non-trade barriers present 
obstacles to taking full advantage of commercial treaties, while the country’s regulatory 
framework has failed to create the correct incentives for entrepreneurship to “take off” and inject 
dynamism into the economy.  
In Mexico, complying with the rule of law is onerous, and registering property and 
opening a business is a slow and expensive process. On average, it takes about 28 days and an 
average investment equivalent to 12.5 percent of GDP per capita to complete the nine steps 
necessary to open a business, compared to 0.3 percent in Ireland and 0.7 percent in the United 
States. In addition, Mexico’s onerous fiscal regime represents a burden on productivity and 
profitability for businesses. A firm owner in Mexico deals with 27 different payments, and 
invests approximately 550 hours per year in fiscal procedures, with taxes representing up to 51.5 
of the utilities cost of a business.  In a country like Ireland, the same firm owner would only have 
to deal with nine payments and invest 76 hours in fiscal procedures, with taxes representing up to 
28.8 percent of utilities cost (World Bank, 2009). 
Additionally, the lack of clarity in guarantees and bankruptcy laws in Mexico results in a 
misalignment of incentives for the financial system, and rigid labor regulations increase the costs 
of hiring and firing employees (52 weeks of average salary in Mexico versus four weeks in Japan 
and 24 in Ireland), which reduces incentivess to create new jobs as well as the salary 
expectations of new employees, which in turn affects their productivity (World Bank). 
In order to understand the process by which the Mexican government encourages 
economic growth and firm productivity, this project will analyze productive development 
policies (PDPs) based on their justification and design, and the institutional framework under 
which they operate. Throughout this study, the analysis will focus on the processes of design and 
implementation of PDPs and how these affect the intended or unintended outcomes of these 
policies. 
3 Melo and Rodríguez-Clare (2006) define PDPs as policies aimed at strengthening the 
productive structure of a national economy. The conventional approach to industrial policy 
design consists of outlining existing market and government failures in order to find responses to 
correct them.  However, as Rodrik (2004) points out, the size and magnitude of these failures is 
highly uncertain and therefore strategic collaboration between the public and private sectors 
needs to take place in order to identify the most significant obstacles to restructuring the 
economy and design interventions that are most likely to succeed. Under this framework it 
becomes less important for a country to know how to pick winners than to have an institutional 
setting that promotes knowledge and responsibility-sharing with the private sector and that 
encourages the government to “know” when it is losing and consequently change directions. 
Understanding the process by which PDPs are designed will provide clues to both the 
political economy context and the institutional setting in which they are promoted and 
implemented. Throughout this study, the analysis of PDPs will focus on the following: i) whether 
they are designed based on market and/or government failures or respond to other criteria; ii) the 
capacities embedded in implementing institutions; iii) the roles and motivations of relevant 
institutions and stakeholders, as well as the incentives created by PDPs for collaboration among 
these actors; and iv) outcomes, intended and unintended, resulting from the design and 
implementation of PDPs. 
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) identify four kinds of market failures that call for 
government intervention, namely: i) self-discovery externalities, by finding out what the country 
is good at producing; ii) coordination externalities, by targeting specific industries or activities 
that require high initial investments; iii) provision of missing public goods, such as 
infrastructure, regulation, and certification; and iv) information externalities, by correcting for 
situations where social returns to an investment outweigh private ones.  
Sometimes government intervention can produce unwanted results, limiting the 
incentives for firms in a given country to increase their productivity. In this context, PDPs, 
instead of responding to failures in the market, can be designed as a second-best response to 
deficiencies in the market caused by ineffective government intervention. Government failures 
can result from: i) information deficiencies in quantity and quality with respect to the market—
demand, costs incurred by entrepreneurs, externalities—which make it more difficult to diagnose 
the type of regulation required and therefore result in an additional burden for firms; ii) private 
4 capture of regulators and policymakers, whether due to political or economic pressures, can 
result in regulation or government intervention being biased in favor of the regulated sector; and, 
iii) a dilemma between short- and long-term solutions and the search for social objectives, which 
are not necessarily compatible with the search for market efficiencies (CAF, 2006). 
In the analysis of current PDPs in Mexico, this study will evaluate whether PDPs respond 
to market failures and/or government failures. When PDPs are not designed to respond to 
specific market failures they can produce unwanted results or even be completely ineffective. In 
cases when PDPs respond to government failures, it is important to determine the reasons why 
the failure cannot be corrected in the first place and whether PDPs will be effective at addressing 
the problem in a second-best manner.  
Specific sectors and activities were selected for analysis based on their policy relevance, 
particularly since the year 2000. The focus on increasing competitiveness contained in National 
Development Plans (NDPs) translates into an emphasis on transversal activities that, by 
themselves, could result in higher economic growth. Mainly, the NDP focuses on the importance 
of supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)—which make up over 99 percent of 
the country’s firms—as well as innovation activities through higher investment in research and 
development (R&D). In addition, despite its absence in the NDP, our study will also focus on 
analyzing training activities in order to understand policies that deal with human capital 
development beyond the educational system. In terms of specific sectors, the NDPs of 2001 and 
2007 provide clues as to which industries the government considers relevant to its process of 
productive transformation. This study will focus on software and IT services and on aerospace. 
The software and IT industry bears particular weight in the country’s prospective development 
given its potential to affect productivity throughout all economic sectors. Aerospace, on the other 
hand, provides an interesting case study of the potential for productive transformation, since the 
existence of a relatively developed automotive sector in Mexico could serve as a basis for 
moving into higher value-added activities and scaling up the production ladder. Table 1 classifies 
selected PDPs on their Horizontal/Vertical dimension with the Public/Market channel of 
intervention. 
5 Table 1. Classification of Selected PDPs 
   Horizontal  Vertical 
Public Input  
Airport infrastructure 
(spillovers to rest of the 
economy) 
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for individuals and 




Source: Adapted from Inter-American Development Bank (2008).  
 
 




From the 1950s to the mid-1980s, Mexico based its economic policies on the import-substitution 
and industrialization (ISI) model. PDPs implemented during this phase ranged from limited 
import quotas and high tariffs, to price controls for public inputs, to subsidies for specific 
products, to limited monetary supply. While these policies accelerated growth in the industrial 
sector at the expense of the primary sector (e.g., agriculture), this new industrial sector was 
characterized by firms with low and inefficient economies of scale and high unit costs, incapable 
of competing in international markets.  
The ISI model created distortions in the economy as well as an anti-export bias, a 
reduction in the total value of agricultural production, and finally, a productive structure less 
intensive in labor and biased toward use of capital. After the 1982 financial crisis, the 
government had no option but to begin reforming a system that was clearly dysfunctional, 
shifting its economic policies to those based on the so-called Washington Consensus 
(Williamson 1989): achieve and maintain macroeconomic stability, and end the government 
stranglehold over the country’s productive sectors. PDPs shifted toward export and investment 
6 7 
promotion, focusing mostly on the manufacturing industry through the maquila model. Though 
most sectors were liberalized, very important ones remained closed to competition, including 
telecommunications and energy. In addition, the failure to reform the country’s regulatory 
framework resulted in remaining entry barriers for the whole economy (e.g., onerous financial 
system and labor regulation).  
After facing a major financial crisis in 1994, which resulted from a mixture of rapid high-
risk credit expansion, a fixed exchange rate, and a depletion of foreign reserves, achieving 
macroeconomic stability became the main priority. From 1995 to 2000, economic policies were 
directed at stabilizing the economy and creating solid macroeconomic conditions to prevent 
another economic debacle. Mexico’s entry to NAFTA and newly acquired full access to the 
largest market of the marked the end of the closed economy but also highlighted large 
inefficiencies in the Mexican private sector, which found itself for the most part unable to 
compete in international markets.  
Since 2000, the government has maintained its focus on macroeconomic stability. Public 
finances are healthy and monetary policy has remained stable, creating the conditions for 
attracting increasing levels of investment. However, the new party in power inherited a relatively 
unprofessional bureaucracy, a multiplicity of new interest groups, and a strong political 
opposition, particularly from Congress, which has often resulted in a stagnant policymaking 
process. The lack of political consensus necessary for effective public policies has resulted first 
in less than optimal policies to promote growth and raise living standards and second in long 
delays in approving policies (Stein and Tommasi, editors, 2008). See Table 2 for a summary of 
PDPs since 1956. Table 2. Summary of PDPs in Mexico, 1956-present 
 
Period  Ideological Framework  Policy Instruments  Effects 
1956-1982 
- Dominance of public sector over 
economic activities 
- Limited quotas and high tariffs  - Lack of tecnological progress 
- Closed economy  - Price controls for public inputs  - Low TFP rates 
- Import substitution industrialization 
model 
- Low inflation rates, exchange rate 
stability, positive interest rates and low 
interest income taxes 
- Low non-oil exports growth rates 
- ECLAC, Prebisch-Singer thesis  - Subsidies to agricultural products  - Strong dependence on inputs and 
capital goods  
   - Controlled public deficit through 
limited monetary supply 
- Firms with low or no economies of 
scale 
      - Appreciation of real exchange rate due 
to increasing internal inflation 
1982-1984 
- Increased openness  - Fiscal discipline  - Incomplete liberalization 
- Washington Consensus policies  - Deregulation and privatization of state-
owned companies (at least in some 
sectors) 
 Lack of regulatory framework to 
promote competition 
- Less government participation in 
economy 
- Rationalization of the financial and 
monetary policies 
- Privatization as a transfer from state to 
private monopolies, preventing 
competition in important sectors of the 
economy, such as telecommunications 
   - Trade liberalization  - Government still dominates important 
sectors, such as energy  
1995-today 
- Macroeconomic stability  - Political and economic structural 
reforms (slow process) 
- Openness and macroeconomic stability 
evidenced large inefficiencies remaining 
in Mexican private sector 
- Increased competitiveness     - Close to 50% of GDP is produced by 
only 1% of firms 
- Independent Congress     - Slow TFP growth 
- Decentralization and political 
competition 
     
       Source: Authors’ compilation. 
  
8 2.2 How PDPs Are Shaped 
 
There is no consensus on the development path Mexico wants to follow, or on what it needs to 
do in order to achieve specific goals. The policy debate remains ideological and lacks 
pragmatism. Discussion keeps focusing on whether to protect the agricultural sector from 
NAFTA competitors, who should own the country’s energy resources, or the role of labor 
unions. Unfortunately, none of these issues directly affect productive factors, such as the quality 
of infrastructure, the development of human capital and the ability of the Mexican government to 
articulate a development strategy that can be subscribed by all relevant actors (Rubio, 2001). As 
a result, PDPs are often incongruent with each other, redundant and uncoordinated.  
The government outlines in its National Plan for Development (NDP), and more 
specifically in the sectoral plan of the Ministry of Economy (SE), plan, its objectives for 
industrial policy design. The strategies contained in the Economic sectoral plan target the 
development of SMEs as a general activity as well as support for specific sectors based on their 
weight in economic terms or their potential to increase value added.
1 The NDP and sectoral plans 
are intended to serve as an all-encompassing vision for the country’s development path including 
a prioritization of sectors and activities the government should support in order to encourage 
higher rates of economic growth. They are conceived as six-year programs—in accordance with 
the presidential term—and they are formulated on the basis of consultation with civil society. In 
addition, each state has its own development plan, which may or may not be aligned with the 
NDP and the cabinet’s sectoral plans. 
Other ministries, including those for the areas of Agriculture, Environment, and Tourism, 
design and implement—independently—their own PDPs similar to those of the SE. While PDPs 
should not necessarily be concentrated in one agency, coordination is important. This study will 
provide evidence of the kind of redundancies and inefficiencies in program design and 




It is not clear whether objectives and strategies arise from careful analysis of the 
country’s market and regulatory constraints or whether they are based on the opinions of those 
s with government officials revealed that in practice, the NDP and 
 
1 The list of “strategic sectors” includes the following: automotive, aerospace, electric/electronic, energy, 
biotechnology, software, IT and BPO services, logistics and tourism. See “Política Sectorial¨ section of the 
Economic sectoral plan in “Diez Lineamientos de la Subsecretaría de Industria y Comercio para incrementar la 
Competitividad 2008-2012.”  
9sectoral plans represent little else than a legal requirement containing very few operational 
recommendations. As a government official, promising to meet certain specific objectives 
derives in legal commitments that can then be enforced by the Office of the Comptroller 
(Auditoría Superior de la Federación). Thus, even though a new law requires programs to 
provide a logic framework with specific goals and indicators, due to bureaucratic constraints 
officials have incentives to avoid specificity in program goals. This project will provide evidence 
for the kind of vague language used to set policy objectives, which provides room for maneuver 
without being subject to legal enforcement. This, in turn, makes it difficult for stakeholders—i.e., 
civil society and Congress—to evaluate the impact of PDPs on the country’s productive 
structure. 
 
3.  Training 
 
Based on equity concerns, the government chooses to intervene in the public provision of 
training activities for three main reasons. First, technological change disproportionately affects 
low-skilled workers. Second, firms have fewer incentives to invest in less qualified workers to 
the extent that there exists a relationship between educational attainment levels and 
“trainability.”  In other words, the less qualified a worker, the lower returns a firm obtains for 
training him or her and therefore the fewer incentives firms have to provide training for them. 
The same phenomenon occurs for older workers, who have a shorter time-horizon during which 
firms—and the workers themselves—can obtain returns on their investment. Third and finally, 
other government policies include retraining programs as an alternative to alleviate frictions 
caused by structural changes in the economy which result in the generalized loss of jobs through 
industries or sectors. 
 
training due to lower returns
                                                       
A low-quality educational system
2 –which results from a government failure in the case 
of Mexico—generates an inadequate labor force
3 that tends to require post-school training. 
Fewer abilities translate into higher vulnerability as well as less incentive for firms to offer 
 on investment. The skill-biased nature of recent technological 
 
2 In the PISA test, applied by the OECD in the year 2006 to 15-yr old students, 50 percent obtained scores below  
Level 2, considered the minimum necessary to live in society, and less than 1 percent obtained scores between 
Levels 5 and 6, which means only that proportion of Mexican students is prepared to perform complex cognitive 
activities.  Accesed from Hhttp://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_32252351_32236191_1_1_1_1_1,00.htmlH  
10
3 Only 27 percent of the working population has schooling beyond basic education. Younger cohorts have higher 
levels of schooling, but the workforce still has on average only nine years of schooling. changes thus favors workers with higher educational abilities and negatively affects less 
educated and qualified workers. Technological change additionally increases the negative impact 
of unemployment periods, accelerating in both cases the obsolescence of human capital (de Grip 
and Zwick, 2004). Thus, training programs are often justified by the government’s inability to 
provide the labor force with adequate skills through the educational system.  
In addition, training programs are usually justified by the presence of two kinds of market 
failures (see Acemoglu and Jörn-Steffen, 1998, and Heckman, 2003). The first is an externality 
problem whereby firms in competitive labor markets regard labor mobility as a disincentive to 
invest in training, given the potential for employees to claim wage raises equivalent to the 
marginal productivity acquired through training or take the newly acquired abilities to another 
firm. In both cases, firms are not able to completely appropriate the returns of their investment. 
The problem is exacerbated in the case of general training, which, by definition, provides 
employees with abilities that can be used across more than one firm. 
The high labor mobility observed in the Mexican workforce, particularly amongst low-
skilled workers, could reinforce the effects of the market failure mentioned above.
4 Thus, 
workers have more incentives to invest in obtaining general rather than specialized skills, since 
they perceive a higher value in abilities they can use in a variety of jobs. However, limited access 
to credit could limit employees’ capacity to invest in their own training. Due to its inherent 
characteristics, human capital remains an inadequate form of collateral for obtaining credit. 
Workers could solve the credit problem by accepting lower wages for jobs in which they could 
develop the general abilities they seek. However, the already low wage levels for most of the 
Mexican occupied population could further inhibit their ability to adopt this strategy. Fifty 
percent of Mexico’s occupied population earns less than two minimum wages per month, which 
is equivalent to approximately US$250 (INEGI, 2000).  
The market failure mentioned above tends to result in suboptimal investment for training 
activities, which in turn provides the central argument for public intervention in the subsidy or 
direct provision of training, particularly for low-skilled workers who have less possibilities of 
acquiring training, although returns are higher for higher skilled workers.  
 
                                                        
4 Job tenures in Mexico are short, 6.5 years, compared to those in the United States (9.8), the United Kingdom (7.8), 
and Spain (8.9), as well as the average of OECD countries (Calderón-Madrid 2000).  
11The second market failure has to do with an information asymmetry problem. During the 
hiring process, employers lack complete information to evaluate the quality of job candidates and 
to distinguish between highly and less productive workers. Thus, firms could fail to generate a 
number of jobs, even if a marginal benefit exists to creating that job, if the risk of hiring less 
productive workers is considered to be high. 
Educational attainment levels and training can attenuate the risk resulting from this 
information problem by acting as signals that can help potential employers identify productivity 
levels among workers. In practice, this signaling system will only work if it is the highly 
productive workers who will obtain educational certificates, thereby helping firms separate 
among highly productive and less productive workers. In this framework, training works more as 
an instrument of intermediation for the labor market—solving an information problem- than as a 
mean for the accumulation of human capital (Ibarrarán and Rosas, 2008).  
In addition, given that the real capabilities of an employee can only be measured ex post, 
in a highly regulated labor environment the high cost of firing employees increases the risk to 
firms of employing less productive workers, which seems to be the case of Mexico. According to 
the Doing Business 2009 report, the average cost to fire an employee in Mexico is equivalent to 
52 weeks (1 year) of wages (World Bank, 2009). In this regard, Mexico ranks fifty-sixth out of 
175 countries.  
Despite the existence of real market failures that justify government provision of training 
programs, due to the low returns on investment of training low-skilled and older workers, from 
the social perspective it would make more sense to train workers with higher marginal 
productivity as well as those who are younger, while solving the inequity problem—caused 
caused by a government failure to provide high quality education in the first place—via 
redistribution policies. Impact evaluations of retraining programs in the United States 
consistently indicate that investment by the beneficiary must be considerably high for this type of 
intervention to be effective (Heckman, 1999).  
Table 3 provides a summary of the government and market failures that justify 
government intervention in training programs.  
12 Table 3. Market and Government Failures in Training 
Failure Type  Description 
Low-quality educational system  Government failure  - The skill-biased nature of recent 
technological changes favors 
workers with higher educational 
abilities and affects less qualified 
workers 
- Increases the negative impact of 
unemployment periods, 
accelerating in both cases the 
obsolescence of human capital 
Underinvestment in training 
by firms 
Information externality  - Labor mobility reduces incentives 
for firms to provide training for 
workers, particularly for general 
abilities 
Underinvestment in training 
by workers 
Coordination failure  - Human capital remains an 
insufficient collateral for obtaining 
loans, which limits individuals’ 
access to credit for pursuing 
further credit 
Suboptimal hiring levels due to 
incomplete information 
Information asymmetry  - During the hiring process, 
employers lack complete 
information to evaluate the quality 
of job candidates and to distinguish 
between highly and less productive 
workers. Thus, firms could fail to 
generate a number of jobs. 
       Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
3.1 The Program for Employment Support and BECATE 
The National Employment Service (SNE for its Spanish acronym) was established in 1978 as a 
result of changes made to the Federal Employment Law. The SNE was created to: i) promote 
successful placement of job seekers; ii) encourage training to the unemployed and; iii) pursue a 
systematic study of regional markets. In general, the first two justifications for policy 
intervention provided in 1978 remain the main areas of the Program for Employment Support 
(PAE for its Spanish acronym), the largest program within the General Coordination of 
Employment, the current unit from the Ministry of Employment in charge of SNE. 
In 1982, the BECATE program (then called PROBECAT) was created under the SNE, 
with the specific purpose of providing training scholarships for the unemployed. The program 
was born in the context of one of Mexico’s most severe economic crises, with unemployment 
reaching unprecedented levels, oil prices falling, rising interest rates, and the beginning of the 
country’s commercial liberalization process. It was the typical scenario for creating retraining 
13 programs focused on increasing the workforce’s abilities, which could help them cope with the 
structural economic changes taking place at the time.  
BECATE initially provided scholarships for short-term training (up to three months) in a 
school-based format. The scholarships included tuition and a small living stipend equivalent to 
the monthly minimum wage. Training was provided by public institutions and on occasion by 
subcontracted NGOs. When the training was complete, workers would look for a job using the 
SNE placement offices. 
In 1993 and 1994 two new modalities became part of BECATE: i) on-the-job training 
and ii) self-employment. The introduction of on-the-job training represented a notable 
innovation, since it included both teaching theory and practice at a firm. The school-based 
training was replaced in 1998 by the on-the-job modality as the dominant type of training and the 
former was discontinued in 2001.  
Approximately 4.75 million workers were trained by BECATE between 1984 and 2005. 
At the program’s peak (1995-2000) around 500 thousand workers were trained per year 
(Delajara, Freije and Soloaga, 2006). During 2001-2006 period (the Fox administration), the 
number of beneficiaries as well as BECATE’s budget decreased substantially. In 2001, the 
program trained 400,000 beneficiaries, while by 2002 the number of participants had stabilized 
at 200,000. This reduction is related to budgetary constraints, as well as to the reassignment of 
budgetary resources to other programs within the PAE. In 2007, BECATE benefited 170,000 
trainees, with plans for 90,000 trainees in 2008.    
The real expenditure per beneficiary decreased continually since the beginning of the 
program in 1984 until 1995, when a new economic crisis hit Mexico. In 1984, the average 
expenditure per participant was approximately four times higher than the average spent in 1995. 
Since then, average expenditure has remained relatively stable, at around $600-$800 in 1993 
peso terms (Delajara, Freije and Soloaga, 2006). 
 
3.2 BECATE’s Low-Impact Design and Implementation 
 
The general objective of PAE is to reduce transaction costs for firms and the unemployed in the 
labor market, and to increase the employability of the latter. In this framework, with the support 
of state-level National Employment Services (state-level SNEs), which operate the training 
services, PAE coordinates informational and placement services, subsidizes short-term training 
14 and reallocation expenses, and supports the development of micro-enterprises. Within PAE, 
BECATE is in charge of supporting the unemployed with short-term training to facilitate their 
transition to a job or self-employment.  
BECATE offers training in two modalities: 
 
•  On-the-job training through the “internship” and “mixed” modalities at a 
firm facility. BECATE covers the costs for the beneficiaries’ scholarships and 
the training expenses in the “internship” option (targeted to unemployed 
persons ranging from the ages of 16 to 29) while the firm finances the training 
itself in the “mixed” modality, committing to hire at least 70 percent of the 
trainees.  
•  Self-employment training through “productive training” and “self-
employment training,” which provides training for persons who own or work 
in micro-enterprises or who are interested in founding one. In both cases, 
BECATE pays for all training costs and provides a scholarship for living 
expenses. The training for self-employment approach denotes an interest in 
reaching marginalized populations who might have fewer chances to find a 
formal job either due to their low employability or their location in an area 
with scarce employment opportunities. 
 
Of the three instruments mentioned above, on-the-job training is the most supported by 
the BECATE program since 1998. In the first nine months of 2008, beneficiaries of the “mixed” 
and “internship” modalities accounted for 27 percent and 52, respectively, of the subprogram’s 
total participants. These modalities also exhibit the highest placement rates, as shown in Table 4 
below).  
 
Table 4. Beneficiaries and Placement Rates by Training Modality (2008) 
Training modalities  Number of beneficiaries*  Placement rate* 
Mixta (on-the-job)  14,627  76% 
Práctica Laboral (on-the-job)  27,913  58% 
Autoempleo (self-employment)  2,585  47% 
Productiva (self-employment)  7,367  45% 
Vales de capacitación  719  53% 
* January–September 2008, preliminary data. 
Source: General Coordination of Employment (CGL), Ministry of Labor.  
15 The scholarships offered by BECATE are modest and, as shown in Table 5, the program 
also serves a very limited number of workers. In the case of “self-employment” training the 
program offers the equivalent of a monthly minimum wage (approximately US$120) for up to 
two months. For “on-the-job training” the program offers one-and-a-half minimum wages for the 
“internship” and two minimum wages for the “mixed” modality. Beneficiaries also receive a 
small stipend (of approximately US$40) intended to cover transportation, as well as insurance 
against accidents. The “mixed” modality additionally includes medical insurance, paid for by the 
firm.  
Though BECATE formally targets the population of unemployed or underemployed 16 
and older, in practice the program becomes attractive (and used) for people with low income and 
educational levels. PAE’s Rules of Operation published in December of 2007 estimate 
BECATE’s potential beneficiaries at 11.7 million people, of which the program plans to reach 
91,375 (0.7 percent). In addition, the Rule of Operation requires the program to cover all 
municipalities and localities in the country, giving preference to those with resources and 
mechanisms that facilitate training opportunities. 
The Federal Ministry of Employment is in charge of coordinating PAE’s design and 
implementation. The Ministry of Labor (STPS for its Spanish acronym) defines PAE’s operation 
rules, which define the program components and mechanisms of operation.  Within the STPS, 
the General Coordination of Employment is the unit responsible for implementing PAE and 
therefore the BECATE program. 
Following operations rules published by the STPS, state governments are responsible for 
program operation through their respective SNEs. Most State SNEs are attached to State 
Economic Development Ministries, although their institutional capacity and position in the 
hierarchy may widely differ by state. There are a total of 142 SNE offices in the 32 federal 
entities. State SNEs operate the program and provide matching budget funds while also 
absorbing operation costs.  
According to PAE’s operation rules, State SNEs should involve labor state councils in 
their planning process. These councils should include unions, business associations, academics 
and government representatives. Interviews revealed that in practice, the role and relevance of 
state councils’ members in SNE’s planning is not necessarily homogenous. Once the budget is 
16 received by State SNEs, they must develop an annual plan that specifies how the budget will be 
distributed among PAE’s services and that specifies coverage goals for each component.  
State SNEs assign “advisors” (the program’s contact point with users) to specific 
programs, with the responsibility to fulfill their coverage goals defined in the state-level 
operation plans. This could distort the way that the beneficiaries are assigned to the services 
offered by PAE, particularly because the requirements for each service are so vague that it is 
possible for one candidate to fit in more than one service (UAM Xochimilco, 2008). SNE’s 
advisors might also face difficulties to identify if the host firm would have, in the absence of 
BECATE benefits, hired the same number of trainees and financed their training with its own 
resources. Were this to be true; the PAE investment would result in a transfer from the taxpayers 
to the firm without necessarily being justified. Preventing these situations is costly and it is not 
clear that State SNEs have the institutional capacity and mechanisms to fully avoid them. 
 
3.3 Institutional Capacities 
The programmed budget of PAE in 2007 was MXN$ 1,353 million, with MXN$ 943 million (70 
percent) funded by the federal government and the IDB, and MXN$ 409 million (30) by state 
governments and firms. The actual budget further increased by 16 percent with direct 
contributions from state governments and firms. Almost half of the Ministry’s total budget was 
allocated to the program BECATE.  
Federal fund allocation to PAE follows the same process than other earmarked 
government expenditures. In this case, the Ministry of Employment presents every year a budget 
proposal that includes earmarked funds for PAE and financial resources called for in 
collaboration agreements with international organizations such as the IDB, which then become 
part of the Executive’s budget proposal to Congress. Once in the hands of the legislature, the 
Chamber of Deputies negotiates adjustments to the whole budget and presents a final version to 
the Senate, which then must approve it. Once the Congress approves the budget, the Ministry is 
responsible for allocating PAE funds to the state governments. Funds are distributed among 
states in two large blocks: i) grants defined by the state’s ranking in a set of predefined criteria 
and ii) matching funds grants. Federal funds are earmarked for beneficiaries’ scholarships and 
training expenses, while state governments are responsible for operational expenses, and they 
must additionally supply at least 20 percent of the federal funding received by the state. 
17 At the federal level, the ministry is responsible for coordinating the design and 
implementation for BECATE programs, as well as transfer budgetary allocation to state SNEs. In 
addition, it monitors the delivery of subsidies and is responsible for keeping records and 
gathering monitoring and evaluation indicators. State-level SNEs are in turn responsible for 
program operation. However, interviews with officials revealed variation in the institutional 
capacity and design of state-level SNE offices. Such variation, not only in budgetary allocation 
but also in personnel capacities, can serve as an indicator of how important the program is to the 
state-level administration. An external evaluation (UAM Xochimilco, 2008) indicates that in 
2006 and 2007 the staff working for the federal-level Ministry office in charge of the program 
was reduced by 18 percent, while staff at state-level SNEs increased by 1.8 percent.   
Normative powers and the fact that the largest part of PAE’s budget comes from federal 
funds grants the STPS authority to shape the program’s general form. External evaluations of the 
program agree PAE has built an institutional capacity since its inception. However, substantial 
changes in the period 1998-2001 affected the capabilities of the executing unit, particularly key 
officials with specific knowledge of program operations (IDB, 2006). 
Since the PAE program transfers resources directly to the population, the STPS is 
obligated to formulate and publish Rules of Operation that delineate the program’s 
characteristics and participation requirements every year. The Ministry must meet these 
requirements, in addition to those imposed by the Ministry of Finance for all public expenditures. 
The Ministry of Finance oversees the budget, monitors sub-exercises and authorizes changes to 
program expenditures.  
This normative structure seeks to limit corruption and discretionary spending. In return, it 
increases operational costs, since delays in the approval of resources result in slow program 
implementation. Additionally, the budget is provided and approved on an annual basis.  
A quick revision of BECATE’s list of beneficiaries reveals that several large firms 
receive transfers and interns through this program. Though evidence is hard to come by, 
interviews with some state-level representatives confirm that in some cases, states do use 
programs like BECATE as part of a package to attract investment from foreign firms. (See Table 
5 for a summary.) 
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Table 5. Incentives Embedded in BECATE 
Stakeholder Role  Incentives 
Ministry of 
Employment/General 
Coordination of Employment 
- Coordinate, design and implementation 
of BECATE 
- Set indicators prioritizing coverage and 
placement over increasing employability 
of workers 
- Manage federal budget  - For on-the-job training: Since increasing 
placement rates serves as an indicator of 
success for the program, the STPS runs the 
risk of subsidizing firms for hiring workers 
they would have hired anyway 
- Monitor delivery of subsidies    
- Gather M&E indicators    
State Governments & Local 
Employment Offices (SNEs) 
- Operate program  - Increase budgetary allocation to their 
dependency 
- Complement funds  - Support unemployed population, and 
meet coverage and placement goals 
   - For self-employment: state governments 
might use the program as a social policy 
instrument 
   - Use BECATE as a transfer to firms to 
attract investment 




•  Coverage. About 4.75 million workers were trained by BECATE (and its 
antecessors SICAT and PROBECAT) between 1984 and 2005. At the 
program’s peak (1995-2000) more than 500 thousand workers were trained 
per year. BECATE benefited 170,000 trainees in 2007 and set a goal of 
reaching approximately 90,000 in 2008.  
•  Operational capacity. The actual budget spent by BECATE in 2007 was 16 
perecent larger than planned because of additional contributions from state 
governments and firms. BECATE exceeded its 2006 and 2007 coverage goals 
by more than 50 percent, and most of PAE’s subprograms were able to fulfill 
their budget and coverage goals in 2007.  
•  Placement efficacy. The placement rate of BECATE in the first nine months 
of 2008 was 60 percent, which is around the subprogram’s historic average. 
Place rates in 2007 and 2006 were 75 percent and 57 percent, respectively. 
The “Mixta” (on-the-job) training modality achieved a 76 percent placement 
19 rate, the highest in the subprogram during the period of January-September 
2008. 
 
3.5 BECATE’s Impact 
 
There is a long list of external evaluations of PAE and BECATE. This extensive work is result of 
the role of World Bank (formerly) and IDB as funders, as well as recent legislation approved by 
the Mexican Congress, which made external evaluations compulsory (though these do not 
necessarily translate into accurate measures of program impacts). Despite this long list of 
BECATE’s external evaluations, there are no conclusive estimates of the program’s impact on 
beneficiaries’ levels of employability and wages.  There is some evidence pointing out a positive 
effect of the program on the employment rates of the trainees. There is less clarity about the 
program’s impact on wages. The lack of robust estimators is directly related to the difficulties in 
using a randomly-selected control group. 
Neither PAE nor BECATE have integrated a comprehensive evaluation strategy into their 
design, and therefore it has not been possible to set up an evaluation with experimental design 
that robustly gauges either program’s impact. There are differences in the estimates of the impact 
evaluations done using quasi-experimental methods, but the bulk point out (Delajara, Freije and 
Soloaga, 2006): 
 
•  The program is relatively successful in increasing beneficiaries’ participation 
in the formal sector at least in the short-term. 
•  On-the-job training in large firms has a positive effect on formal employment. 
•  On-the-job training in SMEs has a modest effect, since small and medium 
companies do not necessarily have enough resources to hire workers upon 
program completion. 
•  Neither modality has a significant impact on beneficiaries’ wages, though if 
there is an impact it might be negative in comparison to a control group. 
•  Self-employment does not have a positive effect on beneficiaries in terms of 
either employment rates or future wages. 
•  Given the weakness of the wage estimates, a robust cost-benefit analysis is 
difficult to perform. 
 
20 External evaluations have not focused on providing a general equilibrium view of the 
impact of the program. They have not measured whether participants are more likely to obtain a 
job upon program completion or whether they have “crowded-out” employees the firms would 
have hired even in the absence of the program. 
 
3.6 On-the-Job Training for Large Firms 
 
The introduction of on-the-job training to BECATE represented one of the main changes in the 
history of the program. In the school-based modality—the previous type of training provided by 
BECATE—curriculum topics were defined by program officials, and training was provided by 
public institutions in a school-like context. With on-the-job training, BECATE matches job 
seekers with firms interested in hosting them. In this modality firms define curriculum topics, 
therefore guaranteeing their relevance in labor markets.  
Upon obtaining training within firms, trainees are exposed to “real” labor market 
experience, which could be positive in terms of learning as well as signaling for the market. In 
the case of “mixed” training, the private sector pays part of the bill (they pay the training costs as 
well as a medical insurance for the workers), which represents less cost for the government and 
serves as an additional indicator of the value firms assign to the program.  
That host firms are able to design their own training programs indicates that the training 
obtained by participants will be specific to that firm. In terms of whether on-the-job-training 
addresses the coordination failure mentioned above, which suggests that general training will be 
more effective as a mechanism to improve human capital, it is possible that firms could be 
receiving a subsidy for something they would have done anyway. Thus, the quantity of training 
would not increase as a result of public intervention, which would represent from this 
perspective a transfer from taxpayers to participating firms. 
For the case of the “internship” modality, the rationale behind not asking the firm to 
cover costs or to hire the employee upon completing the program has to do with the program 
targeting younger employees, who have higher rates of unemployment. (See Table 6 below.) 
 
21 Table 6. Unemployment Rates by Age in Mexico  
Percentage, 2nd quarter 2008 
 
   Unemployment rate 
Total  3.50% 
14 to 19 year-olds  6.92% 
20 to 29 year-olds  5.70% 
30 to 39 year-olds  2.82% 
40 to 49 year-olds  2.00% 
50 to 59 year-olds  1.96% 
60+ year-olds  1.28% 
Not specified  1.70% 
                                                      Source: INEGI, Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación 
                                                      y Empleo, 2008. 
 
However, it is not yet clear that younger cohorts face higher unemployment rates 
because they face more difficulties during the hiring process or because they have a lower 
opportunity cost of remaining unemployed than their older counterparts, since they tend not to be 
heads of family. Having a specific program for younger workers is positive in the sense that it 
identifies a real problem, higher youth unemployment rates, but bases the intervention on the 
premise that these higher unemployment rates are due to discrimination issues. If this hypothesis 
is wrong, with younger workers having in reality a lower opportunity cost of remaining 
unemployed for longer periods, then not having a choice between the “internship” and the 
“mixed” modality (which requires firms to hire at least 70 percent of participants) could produce 
negative effects.  Therefore, the “internship” modality would only make sense for less productive 
workers who need to gain work experience and who would not be attractive for firms 
participating in the “mixed” modality, independent of their age. 
The “mixed” modality of on-the-job training can also be seen in terms of meeting the 
governmental strategy of reducing transaction costs in the labor market. This would address the 
perennial problem of asymmetric information faced by a hiring firm (which has limited 
information for distinguishing between high and low-quality job seekers), a problem   
exacerbated by the high costs of firing workers imposed by Mexican labor market regulation. In 
this case, only relatively more productive workers would choose to participate in the type of 
training that allows employers to measure their marginal productivity. In this sense, on-the-job 
training is a subsidy that allows hiring firms to reduce information costs for gauging the quality 
of the job seeker. The problem is that there is no way to know for sure that the firm would have 
22 hired the employee whether or not he or she had participated in the government-sponsored 
training program. 
 
3.7 “Self-Employment” as an Escape Valve 
 
The “self-employment” training modality is an alternative more suitable for disadvantaged 
groups, who might have fewer chances to find a formal job either due to their low employability 
or their location in an area with scarce employment opportunities. It also provides an alternative 
for the STPS to contribute to the development of more marginalized regions. This responsibility 
includes specific commitments (contained in the General Law for Social Development), such as 
participation in the program for the Local Development of Microregions. 
There are two issues of asymmetric information that might affect the efficiency in the 
selection process. First, SNE’s advisors have incomplete information about the main motivation 
of a potential beneficiary to ask for support.  Second, SNE might find it difficult to determine 
whether the applicant is interested in training as a mean to find a job or is interested in receiving 
the cash transfer for living expenses but unwilling to participate in the labor market. The 
applicants in the second case do not have incentives to reveal the relevant information. In 
BECATE, this problem might be larger in the self-employment modalities, because this training 
type requires lower levels of effort than on-the-job training. If this is the case, PAE might be 
subject to rent-seeking or might be considered as an expensive alternative to provide cash 
transfers to the needy.  
Thus, the “self-employment” training program does not necessarily solve the 
intermediation or the human capital accumulation dilemma. Instead, it provides an escape valve 
in terms of crises for workers who tend to suffer more, but one that could easily be subject to 
rent-seeking. 
 
3.8 Response to Market and Government Failures 
   
Training programs in Mexico tend to be designed to address social and budgetary objectives 
rather careful analysis of market failures. While an inadequate educational system creates the 
need for further training of workers, creating training programs based on the government’s 
failure to provide high-quality educational services does not solve the initial problem. Rather, it 
serves as a second-best policy.  
23 BECATE was not designed to respond to firms’ and workers’ underinvestment in training 
due to concerns with labor mobility and limited access to capital, both market failures. Instead, 
PAE and BECATE seem to operate as a safety-net mechanism in times of economic hardship 
(e.g., economic crises and environmental disasters). These training programs probably do 
provide an effective tool to reduce information costs faced by firms in gauging job-seekers’ 
quality. However, the programs’ selection process is not designed to respond to the asymmetrical 
information market failure. 
First, State SNE’s advisors have incomplete information on potential beneficiaries’ 
primary motivation for requesting support. SNE might find difficult to determine whether an 
applicant is interested in training as a means to find a job, or whether he or she is interested in 
receiving the cash transfer for living expenses, but is not willing to participate in the labor 
market. The applicant in the second case does not have incentives to reveal the relevant 
information. In BECATE, this problem might be larger in the self-employment modalities, 
because this training type requires lower levels of effort than on-the-job training. If this is the 
case, PAE might be subject to rent-seeking or might be considered as an expensive alternative to 
provide cash transfers to the needy. 
Second, it is not easy for PAE and BECATE implementation officials to identify whether 
the program leads to hiring of new personnel or to more training. There is not a mechanism to 
determine whether “host” firms would have hired and trained workers even without the program.  
 
3.9 Effectiveness of the Program 
Due to low returns on investment of training for low-skilled and older workers, public 
investment would yield higher returns in the education of the younger and more productive. In 
Mexico government spending (6.4 percent of GDP in 2004) and coverage of the national 
education system have dramatically increased in the past few decades going from 4.5 years of 
education in 1976 to 8.2 years in 2006 (OECD, 2007a). Nonetheless, only a minority of the 
population has completed secondary school, and even fewer have completed higher levels. 




The BECATE training program sets out to accomplish two main objectives: i) improve the 
quality of human capital (through training); and, ii) reduce transaction costs in the labor market 
(through its internship program). In reality, the program’s outcomes tend to reflect a better fit 
with the second goal, reducing transaction costs, while only those with a very low-skill base 
benefit from the kind of training they receive through BECATE. Furthermore, the on-the-job 
modality tends to work better than the “self-employment” modaility. More importantly, it seems 
that the program is trying to “make up” for the inadequacies of Mexico’s labor environment, 
acting as a second-best solution to a problem of legal incentives. 
The following recommendations should help the Ministry of Labor, as well as the state-
level SNEs, look more in-depth at the impact of their programs and consider the possibility of 
addressing training goals through different means.   
 
•   Re-evaluate BECATE’s stated objectives. As currently stated, the 
program’s goals create incentives for individuals to game the system and 
access the program several times without being turned down. A look at the 
data, which are not available to the public, should reveal whether this is 
happening. Mexico does not offer unemployment insurance, and BECATE 
seems to be filling that void even when its stated objectives have more to do 
with improving skills and reducing transaction costs.  
•  One-shot impact evaluation of skills attained through the program. Using 
a random selection of individuals who participated in the program, perform a 
skill-based evaluation at six months and at one year after program completion. 
Though it seems obvious, this type of evaluation does not take place. In fact, 
program indicators of success do not include “improvement in skills”—
though this is difficult to measure—but rather focus on placement rates, even 
when the program’s objective is to increase human capital. BECATE is 
supposed to be complementary to the SNE placement services—which exist at 
the federal and state levels—but rather ends up serving the same purpose. 
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•  The self-employment modality should disappear. It is not clear whether the 
abilities obtained through BECATE by microentrepreneurs actually increases 
their employability, especially since the program is not specialized in creating 
sustainable microfirms. The Ministry of Labor should consider transferring 
the “self-employment” modality to either the Ministry of Social Development 
or the Ministry of Economy, which are better suited to address 
microenterprise needs. 
•  Transform the program to offer general rather than specialized skills. 
BECATE’s “on-the-job” training provides individuals with the opportunity to 
acquire skills on-site for at least three months. When training is done by the 
company itself, it tends to be specific to that company, which means it is 
hardly applicable to other types of jobs. While this is positive in order to 
reduce transaction costs of hiring and being hired for employers and workers, 
in reality, it does not contribute to meeting the program’s first goal, which is 
to increase human capital skills. The deadweight loss to society (from not 
providing individuals wth general skills) is sufficiently high to transfer money 
to a program that only seeks to reduce transaction costs, which are created by 
rigid labor laws. An alternative would provide individuals with more general 
skills that they can transfer across companies. 
 
4.  Innovation 
 
Setting positive conditions for innovation to take off, while creating incentives for the promotion 
of an innovative entrepreneurial class, must be key features of any country’s innovation policy in 
order to ensure competitiveness, and by doing so, increasing the wealth of its citizens. Many 
countries have implemented a set of policies that aim to systematize innovation activities; in 
general, they take the form of a National Innovation System (NIS). 
A NIS is defined by Intarakumnerd, et al. (2002). as the “interactive system of existing 
institutions, private and public, aiming to create, store and transfer knowledge and skills to 
define new means of Science & Technology (S&T) within national borders. Interaction among 
these institutions can be technical, commercial, legal, social or financial.” National Innovation 
Systems not only aim to set the conditions for consolidating science and technology and research 
26 & development and innovation (R&D+i) within a country, but also to ensure the products, 
processes and services developed by the country can compete in global markets.  
From 1998 to 2006 Mexico consistently increased its gross R&D expenses (GERD) 
relative to GDP, with total growth of 46 percent over this period. However, Mexico remains 
behind its commercial partners, particularly in terms of private sector-sponsored R&D 
investment. In 2005, Mexico reported 49 percent of total R&D was financed by the public sector, 
while in the United States the private sector reaches 69 percent, with comparable figures of 74 
percent in Japan and 76 in Korea (CONACYT, 2007). Figures 2 and 3 illustrate GERD as a 
percentage of GDP and source of financing for R&D activities. 
Additionally, indicators related to number of researchers and scientific publications 
produced in Mexico further illustrate the country’s gap with respect to its commercial partners. 
While there are 1.1 researchers per 1,000 inhabitants in Mexico, Japan boasts 11.1, the United 
States 9.7, and Argentina 2.3. Only 0.8 percent of the world’s scientific publications are 
produced in Mexico, whereas the US contributes 32.3 percent of the world’s total, Korea 2.6 
percent, and Brazil 1.9 percent (CIDAC with data from CONACYT). 
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27 Figure 3. GERD Source of Funding, Selected Countries 
(Percentage) 
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             Source: CIDAC with data from CONACYT. 
 
 
Patents face a similar situation, with Mexico also lagging behind its partners. While 
Mexico produces 0.05 patent applications per 10,000 inhabitants, in the United States this figure 
reaches 6.5, with 21.9 in Korea and 30.8 in Sweden (see “inventiveness coefficient” in Figure 4). 
After NAFTA was implemented in 1994, the amount of patent applications in Mexico grew more 
than in the prior 20 years (Aboites, 2003). Interestingly, and probably as a result of the surge of 
imports resulting from market liberalization, patent registration was mostly driven by foreign 
companies operating in Mexico. While patents by Mexicans grew by 26.7 percent from 1998 to 
2006, patents by foreigners grew by 42.3 percent. This figure is more than 20 times higher than 
that for the United States—as the “dependency ratio”
5 line in Figure 4 illustrates, 22.4 in Mexico 




5 “Dependency ratio” refers to the proportion of patents registered by foreigners in each country. As Figure 4 shows, 
this ratio is much higher for Mexico than for most other countries in the sample, which serves as an indication of the 
relatively low levels of patents registered by Mexican scientists and companies. 
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Figure 4. Patent Dependency Ratio and Inventiveness Coefficient(2004) 
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      Source: CIDAC with data from CONACYT. 
 
Relatively low investment in R&D as well as a small private share of R&D funding can 
result from market and government failures which tend to hinder innovation. Nonetheless, the 
potential for positive spillovers of correcting these failures represents an important opportunity 
for improvement in the area of innovation policy in Mexico.  
In Mexico, the list of challenges and failures which need to be addressed in order to 
develop a competitive NIS and therefore promote higher levels of investment in technological 
innovation and therefore increasing the country’s wealth, include the following. (See Table 7 for 
summary):  
 
•  Uncertain appropriability: Given that the social benefits of innovating tend 
to be higher than the returns that can be claimed by the entrepreneur, unless 
entrepreneurs can ensure the appropiability of their efforts (Hausmann and 
Rodrik, 2003), investments can remain at suboptimal levels. Many countries 
opt to use patent registration as the means by which entrepreneurs can 
appropriate the benefits of their inventions, obtaining protection from 
competition for a number of years.  
29 In Mexico, this market failure is magnified by low contract 
enforcement and by uncertain intellectual property rights protection. For 
example, the Mexican Institute for Intellectual Property (IMPI) is the agency 
in charge of the registration of all patents, brands, products, and similar 
designations.  IMPI therefore has control and supervision responsibilities over 
pharmaceutical patents in the country. However, another agency, the Federal 
Commission for Protection against Sanitary Risks (COFEPRIS), also controls 
and approves which medicines can reach the market. These two agencies do 
not necessarily coordinate their efforts and intellectual property rights 
problems occur. As such, it has occurred that a patent correctly registered 
through the IMPI, is violated in the market by a generic-brand medicine 
approved for sale by the COFEPRIS despite the patent’s validity. The key 
problem is that COFEPRIS has the authority of allowing medicines to be sold 
in Mexico, but it is no obligated to consult the IMPI regarding valid patents. 
Pharmaceutical companies in this situation can definitely appeal to the justice 
system; however, this process almost always takes more than 24 months, time 
during which the patent may expire or time over which the patent holder is 
losing revenues.  
•  Limited access to competitive finance: Entrepreneurs wishing to invest in 
innovative products or services face difficulties finding cost-effective 
financing mechanisms. No market actor is fully capable of recognizing the 
benefits of a new product or service ex-ante. As a result, financial institutions, 
in order to provide financing for such innovations would have to raise the 
price of credit and therefore become unattractive for the firm. A new idea is, 
by definition, riskier than a proven one, therefore the project has a higher 
chance of failing and the bank has more strict requirements in order to lend to 
the entrepreneur. In Mexico, the most frequent requisites include: i) the 
entrepreneur’s company has to be established for at least 2 to 3 years (this 
leaves no opportunity for start-ups); ii) companies should not have any credit 
commitments; and iii) companies should have enough assets to guarantee the 
amount of the loan. This failure is further exacerbated when competition is 
30 limited in the financial market, which also limits incentives for reducing the 
costs of credit, as is the case in Mexico. 
Government programs to encourage innovation activities try to solve 
this problem through guarantee schemes. Regrettably, the government 
guarantee asks for almost as many requirements as the banking system. As 
consequence, many entrepreneurs leave their projects without ever reaching 
the market. 
•  Coordination failure: Innovation is almost always a collaborative game as it 
demands ideas, resources and time from many institutions in order to reach 
optimal levels. Entrepreneurs and firms usually lack incentives to collaborate 
with each other due to the competitive nature of markets and the probability of 
not being able to appropriate investments, therefore resulting in suboptimal 
investments in R&D+i. This failure calls for government intervention, 
especially in ensuring that investments required upstream and downstream are 
realized in order for innovation to develop.  
 
  In addition to the market failures mentioned above, the Mexican case should also be 
analyzed taking into account the existence of particular government failures which also limit 
innovation activities: 
 
•  Limiting regulation of public research institutions: Countries that are 
successful in promoting innovation take full advantage of universities and 
research centers in order to realize synergies between the private sector and 
academia (OECD, 2007a). This is not the case in Mexico, where most 
publicly-funded research institutions, which happen to be the most qualified in 






•  High costs of registering patents: The cost of regulation can as well be 
identified in perspective using the Doing Business 2009 (World Bank, 2009) 
analysis. For a totally new project, one that requires the set up of a firm in 
arket, in addition to the five processes and 74 days required in 
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31Mexico to register an idea, the entrepreneur will have to complete nine more 
processes during approximately 28 additional days. The entrepreneur can 
therefore spend over three months and complete 14 processes to make the new 
project a reality. Add to this the processes and time required to solicit funding 
from a government-sponsored innovation supporting program, a private bank 
or an incubator, and the picture becomes even grimier.  
 
Table 7. Market and Goverment Failures in Innovation 
Failure Type  Description 
Uncertain 
appropiability  
Information externality & 
Government failure: Poor 
protection of intellectual 
property rights 
- Social benefits > private benefits of 
innovation  
- Deficiencies in property rights 
protection  
Limited access to 
finance 
Information asymmetry  - Difficulty of knowing benefits of 




Coordination failure & 
Government failure: 
Regulation prohibits public 
research institutions from 
commercializing their 
inventions 
- Competition limits incentives for 
collaboration among entrepreneurs and 
firms, which can result in suboptimal 
investments in R&D+i. 
- Regulations limits incentives for 
collaboration and finding synergies 
between academia and the private 
sector 
- Burdensome procedures for opening a 
business and registering patents, which 
discourages entrepreneurship and 
innovation. 
       Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
4.1 Policy Response: CONACYT and the AVANCE Program 
Mexico’s efforts to promote innovation activities can be traced back to 1970 when the National 
Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) was created in order to articulate a 
coordinated strategy in science and technology (S&T) promotion. Since then, CONACYT has 
led the country’s innovation policy. 
CONACYT’s work has been consistent with the country’s political and economic reality. 
During the 1970s and the 1980s, it focused on developing domestic innovative solutions—
following the ISI model—for sectors such as the metal, mining, and automotive industries, which 
32 then were considered as priority in the national agenda. During the 1990s, as Mexico became 
more and more integrated into the global economy, CONACYT’s objective shifted towards the 
support of exports. Then, in 2002, CONACYT became an autonomous agency, now independent 
from the Education Ministry. The agency maintained its focus on promoting innovation for 
global markets but gained a new role through finding synergies with other government 
institutions as well as creating academic networks at a national and international level. 
Nowadays, CONACYT promotes innovation using a series of funds to support needs of 
specific segments along Mexico. These programs are organized into five sets: 
 
•  Formation of scientists: scholarships, grants, events, etc., oriented to recruit 
and develop Mexican scientists.  
•  Scientific research: grants and promotion mechanisms to support S&T 
research in public & private sector. 
•  Innovation and technology development: programs to stimulate and align 
incentives to promote innovation and investment. 
•  International cooperation in S&T: coordination of global communications 
in order to integrate Mexican S&T effort world-wide. 
•  Information about the country’s S&T status: Increase awareness among 
domestic and foreign stakeholders of CONACYT’s programs and 
achievements, and also monitor the evolution of Mexican innovation system. 
 
Given this project’s interest in understanding activities that promote direct innovation in 
firms, the focus for analysis will remain on the third set of programs, those in the “Innovation 
and technology development category.”  
In particular, this analysis will focus on AVANCE, a program designed to identify new 
business ideas based on science and technology. The AVANCE program, though very small in 
coverage and budgetary capacity, seems to be complementary to the accelerator programs for 
SMEs coordinated through the Ministry of Economy. In practice, while the two programs do not 
share funds, it is understood, as revealed during interviews, that while the accelerator program 
for SMEs can include all industries, the AVANCE program focuses on science and technology 
companies. 
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AVANCE is an integral program devoted to the detection and promotion of innovation 
projects based on S&T. To do so, AVANCE is segmented into nine sub-programs, each intended 
to meet specific needs of entrepreneurs and researchers considering the projects’ status and the 
requirements needed to get these projects to market. Its targets are institutions, universities, 
research centers, laboratories, and firms related to S&T activities, which are registered in the 
National Registry of S&T Institutions and Companies (RENIECYT). See Table 8 for a summary 
of AVANCE’s subcomponents. Table 8. AVANCE’s subprogram components 
Sub-program Objective  Support  fields 
News Businesses  Economic support for proven S&T developments in 
pre-market phase. 
- IPR-related expenses. 
- Management consulting and support 
- Funding of feasibility studies 
- Building of concepts and prototypes 
- Documentation of projects engineering 
- Processing of registrations and official certifications. 
Entrepreneurship Fund CONACYT-
NAFIN 
Capital support to S&T SMEs consolidation  - Working capital funding 
- Fixed assets funding 
- Development of strategic business plan (commercial, 
legal, finance & technology) 
- Management consulting and support 
- Other related expenses 
Guarantee Fund  Trust fund to support commercial expansion of S&T 
firms in the development of new products, services and 
increase production capabilities. 
- Funding to purchase or maintain fixed assets. 
- Working capital funding 
- Support on patents and related rights 
- Design / re-design of engineering and plants 
- Management consulting and support 
- Other related expenses 
Patent support  Economic support in patenting process to researchers, 
institutions and SMEs. 
- IPR enforcing expenses 
- Technical advising in regulation and related processes 
- Payment of 100% of registration and patent expenses 
- Other related expenses 
Technological Packages  Economic support to public universities and research 
centers for commercial expansion of proved S&T 
developments. 
- IPR enforcing expenses 
- Management & legal consulting support 
- Technical and economic feasibility studies funding 
- Building of concepts and prototypes 
- Engineering transfer manuals 
- Processing of registrations and official certifications 




Table 8. AVANCE’s Subpogram Components (continued) 
Technology Transfer offices  Economic support to public institutions or S&T private 
incubators to create offices which facilitate 
development of S&T projects. 
- Initial legal assistance 
- Adoption of benchmarking projects on licensing, 
technology & tech transfer. 
- Office set up and integration consultants 
- Related travel expenses 
AVANCE Business Schools  Economic support for training programs on S&T for 
businesses. 
- Firms: expenses related to training on technology. 
- Universities & public research centers: expenses 
related to training to use, manage and development of 
technology at a firm level. 
Strategic Alliances & Innovation 
Networks for Competitiveness 
(AERIS) 
Support for the integration of innovation networks 
between firms, research centers and universities. 
- Training of human resources according to demand, 
and support on incorporation of researches to 
productive sector. 
Seed Capital Fund  Promotes the development of firms based on S&T in 
period of incubation or start-up. 
- Seed firms: Temporary recoverable support to 
innovative firms in pre-market phase 
- Fund or association: Temporary contribution to risk 
capital funds in phase of seed capital to support start-up 
of innovation firms 
       Source: Authors’ compilation. 4.2 AVANCE’s Convoluted Design and Implementation 
In order to access funds from the AVANCE program, entrepreneurs must first undergo the 
selection process at the federal level, that is, get approval from CONACYT. All proposals have 
to be presented during the “convocatoria” period. Upon receiving each proposal, a group of 
accredited evaluators (RCEA, for the acronym in Spanish) chosen by CONACYT reviews the 
project on a technical basis, determining whether it is innovative and has a competitive 
advantage. If approved by the RCEA group, the project is passed on to the group of membership 
analysis (GAP for its acronym in Spanish); in essence, the GAP evaluates whether projects are 
potentially commercially viable. Once approved by the GAP, the project goes on to a final 
evaluation stage by AVANCE’s Technical Council, which is composed of CONACYT staff. 
Following approval by CONACYT, state governments (which provide matching funds 
for AVANCE projects) have the final word, and they may or may not decide to support a project 
depending on the priorities they have established for development of science and technology 
projects. While this information should be made public at the beginning of a governor’s tenure 
(through State Development Plans), entrepreneurs indicated in their interviews that it is usually 
very difficult to obtain this information prior to applying for project funding with CONACYT. 
As a result, an entrepreneur can undergo the whole process with CONACYT, receive approval 
from the Technical Council, be ready to work with a specific incubator or accelerator, and finally 
see the whole project fall if his or her project does not happen to match the state government’s 
priorities. 
If a project is finally approved, funds are then transferred to intermediary agencies, which 
by law should be either public universities or incubators and accelerators which only receive 
public funding. Since the entrepreneur works with the universities or the incubator or 
accelerators during the whole application process, by the time funds are transferred from 
CONACYT to one of these intermediary agencies, they will be able to access their services and 
start the project. 
In theory, the program requires follow-up and performance evaluations for each project. 
By definition follow-up is carried out at the end of every declared period of the approved project 
and includes a technical report and a financial report. Reporting is made directly to the 
AVANCE Technical Council, which has the authority to decide whether to continue providing 
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program. 
Additionally, an Impact Report is presented at the end of the project to the AVANCE 
Technical Council; in this report the beneficiary of the support declares the project’s results, 
benefits, and possible additional businesses. This is the information used by CONACYT to 
report AVANCE’s performance. The beneficiary is requested to deliver Impact Reports three 
years after the conclusion of the project in order to have a follow-up database regarding the 
supported program’s performance. Unfortunately, the data are not publicly available to perform 
independent evaluations. Finally, AVANCE Technical Council has the authority to conduct an 
independent ex-post evaluation. We did not find public evidence of any such evaluations 
undertaken to date. 
 
4.3. Institutional Capacities 
 
The implementation process discussed above reveals the potential for conflicting incentives 
existing in the design of the program, which can limit entrepreneurs’ ability to access funds from 
the AVANCE program.  
In an effort to direct innovation policy to specific sectors, Mexican authorities segmented 
budgetary resources for innovation activities by ministry. Thus, each agency follows an 
independent agenda, as the incentives to compete for funding from Congress limit their 
motivation to coordinate efforts. As a result, entrepreneurs wishing to apply for government 
programs to support innovation often face duplication in many processes as well as additional 
restrictions for projects’ approval. In addition, segmented budgets limit the government’s 
capacity to support projects that need higher amounts of money, specifically those projects 
intensive in the use of fixed capital. 
CONACYT, responsible for operating programs like AVANCE, depends on the 
legislative branch’s budget allocation to sustain their operations year after year. In addition, the 
lack of accountability on the part of Congress and the federal government provides incentives for 
CONACYT to set vague goals and indicators of success so that it can spend all of its resources 
by the end of the year in order to avoid budget cuts.  
Programs like AVANCE are designed to prevent corruption and discretionary resource 
allocation; thus, rules of operation prevent any authority (federal or local) from delivering 
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like CONACYT act through state governments and intermediary agencies (IAs).  
Decision-making power was granted to local authorities based on the idea that their 
proximity to local conditions will inform their actions to stimulate local economic growth. To 
ensure that state-level governments use their R&D budget in a reasonable manner and prevent 
free-rider problems, programs also require local authorities to provide matching funds for every 
project. While this is a positive requirement, which also creates ownership of programs at the 
local level, entrepreneurs can get caught in political games if a state government decides not to 
provide funds for a specific project. This can happen if a local authority chooses to favor a 
particular industry or sector, which does not include the entrepreneur’s choice. In this case, the 
project is rejected at the last minute, even if it has already passed all federal requirements and 
processes.  
Funds are then channeled through IAs, including universities and private incubators or 
accelerators. Incubators specialize in what is called “seed capital” to support new ventures, while 
accelerators are oriented toward stimulating ongoing projects. These IAs are charged with the 
responsibility of supervising the use of the budget as well as supporting the firm through training 
and consulting services. 
Although this procedure seems adequate, it is not shielded against negative externalities. 
Some private universities have started internal incubators and accelerators in order to obtain 
government funding for their own R&D budget. Private universities’ incubators may tend to give 
priority to those projects which are directly or indirectly related to their R&D agenda, which may 
not be the best projects available and could result in a crowding-out effect for independent and/or  
privately funded companies which could more broadly support R&D+I within the country. There 
are 322 incubators nationwide, of which 63 percent are registered by universities (Ministry of 
Economy, 2007), compared to 119 independent incubators. This might be due to the nature of the 
market; however, this phenomenon deserves further analysis in order to determine crowding-out 
effects. Table 9 below describes these conflicts. 
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Table 9. Roles and Incentives in AVANCE & Innovation Programs 
Institution  Role  Incentives 
CONACYT  - Design Rules of Operation and Manual of 
Procedures for AVANCE application 
- Set vague goals prioritizing number of 
supported projects and allocation of entire 
budget in order to maintain funding levels 
year after year. 
- Heads Technical Council which approves 
or rejects projects 
-  Chooses private sector representatives 
for RCEA and GAP evaluation groups, 
based on their technical expertise 
- Approves Intermediary Agencies that 
receive funds from AVANCE  
- Oversight of programs, and follow-up 
State governments  - Provide matching funds for approved 
projects 
- Promote S&T+I projects according to 
local development plan –or that of the 
governor in turn–  without necessarily 
following CONACYT’s priorities or 
coordinating with other state governments. 
- Final word in project approval after 
CONACYT’s review 
- There are no incentives to report specific 
results as CONACYT does not condition 
budget allocation on results. 
Intermediary 
Agencies (IAs): 




- Design and operate programs such as 
incubators and accelerators 
- Some universities have started internal 
incubators and accelerators in order to 
obtain government funding for their own 
R&D budget.  
- University-based incubators have an 
incentive to prioritize projects related to 
their R&D agenda, which may not be the 
best projects available in the market and 
could result in a crowding-out effect for 
independent, privately funded companies.  
       Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
Even though the AVANCE programs seek to encourage and support innovation, at an 
operational level it fails to address negative externalities generated by an inadequate alignment 
of incentives in the market. Observations made about the AVANCE program can be extrapolated 
to the way innovation policy is designed and implemented in the country, resulting in small 




Coordination issues arise between ministries. The process of budgetary allocation, through which 
several ministries carry out innovation-related programs, creates incentives for each ministry and 
agency to act independently in order to maximize budgetary resources. As a result, several 
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prioritizing the impact on entrepreneurial activity in terms of R+D+I investment.  
In addition, federal and state-level authorities also have few incentives to coordinate their 
policy agendas regarding R+D+I activities. Although most of the budget for innovation programs 
is managed by federal agencies, local governments also play a relevant role in the allocation of 
resources. State and municipal authorities can decide which projects deserve support through 
“quality local vote” in innovation programs and funds, which is exercised after federal agencies, 
particularly CONACYT, has decided to support a specific project. As a result, an entrepreneur 
can undergo the project approval process at the federal level and still be rejected by the 
respective state government’s “quality local vote” in the end. Such a situation highlights the few 
existing incentives for creating matching agendas, both at the federal and the state level, to the 
detriment of entrepreneurs. 
 
4.5 Linkage 
In developed countries, universities play a double role: (i) they develop human capital and (ii) 
they produce basic and applied research. In Mexico, most universities do not undertake research. 
Considering that over 95 percent of firms in Mexico are small, and lack human, financial and 
technical resources to develop their own R&D+I activities, linking entrepreneurs to universities 
would create economies of scale and mitigate entrepeneurs’ risk in obtaining basic and applied 
research.  
Innovation requires linkages between at least three actors: government, academics and 
entrepreneurs (OECD, 2007-2008). Mexico’s low share of private funding in R&D+I activities, 
suggests the existence of linkage problems, mainly as a result of incentive misalignment (Helios 
Feria and Hidalgo, 2008). Very few public universities in Mexico are capable of supporting high-
end innovation ideas due to monetary and human resource constraints. As a matter of fact, the 
only university considered to be capable of producing globally competitive R&D is the 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM).  
In addition, certain legal restrictions prevent personnel from public institutions, including 
universities, from commercializing their research findings directly. Universities and private firms 
in Mexico thus have little ability to collaborate, with consequently low levels of investment in 
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private contracts with universities.  
 
4.6 Planning  
While a wide range of programs is intended to support R&D+I in Mexico, there is no 
consolidated NIS. Some of Mexico’s largest challenges in promoting and supporting innovation 
arise from the misconceptions: 
 
•  Innovation is a desirable and fashionable attitude rather than a critical 
component of the country’s development.  
•  Innovation is possible only in high-end sectors intensive in the use of new 
technologies. 
•  Innovation is something that can be done independently. 
•  Innovation is about new products, not necessarily new services or new 
processes. 
 
International experience, as demonstrated by the cases of China (OECD, 2007b) and 
Korea (Solleiro, Castañón, Luna, Herrera and Montiel, 2006) indicate the importance of pushing 
a clear vision as well as a general understanding of R&D+I activities for success.  
The process of strategic planning implies relevant challenges in the design of a NIS in 
Mexico, as well as in the innovation programs that will be part of this system. Currently, the 
design processes of programs as well as their operational mandates are not entirely clear:  
 
•  Objectives are set to be qualitative rather than quantitative: Difficulty to 
define specific measurable objectives does not mean that it should be avoided 
or substituted by operational objectives. If this is the case, the main goal of 
innovation programs may be lost from the beginning. For example, one of 
AVANCE’s main objectives calls for “promoting R&D+I in Mexico to create 
more value added products.” This objective does not define how much value 
has to be added; therefore the authority cannot objectively evaluate if the 
program is successful. 
42  
•  Strategies tend to be vertically integrated and lack horizontal 
perspective: Verticality is observed first, from a ministry perspective, and 
second, from a sector perspective. It is at this point where innovation 
programs start to face coordination and linkage difficulties. The ministries of 
agriculture, economy and education follow independent objectives based on 
their own innovation needs, and each agency manages their programs 
separately. The agency responsible for coordinating innovation programs, 
CONACYT, is not a Ministry and therefore lacks the ability to align 
incentives within a single vision. In other, more successful countries (e.g., 
China and Korea) there is a Ministry for Science & Technology in charge of 
vision and coordination. 
•  Strategies do not necessarily match priorities with competitive 
advantages: For example, the Ministry of Economy has chosen the areas of 
biotechnology, mechatronics (robotics), nanotechnology, software, telecom, 
and alternative energies as priority areas. However, it is unclear how the 
agency chose these sectors and what actions should be taken to become 
competitive at a global level.  
•  Lack of accountability due to weak follow-up mechanisms: To support 
innovation, it is not enough to allow for the provision of financial and 
technical resources. In addition, monitoring and evaluation should be a 
constant activity for each program.  
 
Regrettably this is a major shortfall in the definition of innovation support programs in 
Mexico; actually, objective evaluation mechanisms are weak, and measuring effectiveness and 
impact is not part of the external evaluations so-far undertaken. This is particularly important 
given the lack of measurable objectives, uncertainty about chosen sectors’ competitiveness and 
the limited coordination between different implementing agencies.  
Despite efforts to integrate program planning among agencies and create a national view 
of innovation activities (e.g., Mexico is currently working with the OECD in the development of 
a NIS project; see OECD, 2008), these plans, projects and programs will remain short-sighted 
until there is an officially-empowered office responsible for coordinating efforts. CONACYT 
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ministries and programs towards a common NIS.  
 
4.7 Resources 
Currently Mexico devotes 0.5 percent of GDP to R&D+I activities (GERD), while its 
competitors invest on average 2.3 percent of their production (CONACYT, 2007). Considering 
the difficulty of increasing R&D+I funding to 2.3 percent of GDP in the short-term, the 
immediate challenge is to make the available budget more efficient. Two actions have proven 
effective in other countries: 
 
•  Looking for economies of scale, synergies and horizontal integration of 
resources within programs can result in a more effective use of GERD. 
•  Fiscal discipline is necessary to have better managed and more efficient 
programs. Discipline is about sticking to the plan; fiscal discipline is about 
having clear balance sheets, income statements and positive dividends for 
every program, as well as the ability to integrate new partners when needed 
(e.g., the private sector), and to change or eliminate programs which are not 
giving the expected outcome.  
 
Limited access to competitive financing for new projects restricts the ability of 
entrepreneurs to innovate and therefore requires collaboration between at least three actors: i) 
federal government, ii) local government, and iii) the private sector. Each one of these parts has a 
distinct role in the process: 
 
•  The federal government manages innovation programs, identifies prospective 
projects and determines whether they are candidates for funding, sets 
sunsetclauses and ensures effective use of resources. 
•  Local governments have a local quality vote, taking into account the project’s 
consistency with their own local innovation agenda, as well as their resource 
availability, in order to make a decision regarding the project’s sustainability. 
 
•  The private sector is represented by two actors: first, the entrepreneur itself, 
who sometimes has part of the money needed to start the project; and second, 
the financial sector which may or may not have the willingness to support to 
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the government’s guarantee programs come into play.  
 
In order to realize funding provision for innovation activities, excessive regulation and 
inefficient communication strategies on the part of government programs can result in 
suboptimal levels of funding.  
Excessive regulation can result in negative incentives for entrepreneurs, limiting their 
willingness to even start looking for funding. In addition, excessive regulation can result in the 
creation of additional ineffective markets, such as the contracting of services to go around the 
government bureaucracy. In Mexico, a specialized service in process management has 
developed. This service helps the entrepreneur during the whole fund requesting process, 
although it does not guarantee that the funding will be obtained in the end. As a consequence, the 
entrepreneur incurs an additional cost, and one that is often not considered at the beginning of 
the process. 
The second concern arises from innovation programs’ communication strategies. Lack of 
effective communication about the programs’ goals and requirements will also limit 
entrepreneurs’ access to funding, even if the program exists. 
 
4.8 Response to Market and Government Failures 
 
In general, CONACYT’s programs are oriented toward financing S&T projects, as well as 
promoting linkages between the scientific community and the productive markets. Nonetheless, 
it is clear that these programs do not address the market failures related to the innovation 
process. As a matter of fact, CONACYT’s responsibilities do not currently include ensuring 
appropiability through enforcement of property rights. 
Therefore, incentives within innovation development are still not adequately aligned to 
ensure that entrepreneurs can appropriate the rents related to the innovation process. Instead, 
CONACYT’s role is limited to financing projects, thereby tacitly assuming a risk that would 
normally be the entrepreneur’s responsibility.  
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Even though Mexico started efforts to promote innovation in S&T areas since 1970, it is clear 
that the policy followed by the country has not been as successful as in other regions and 
countries. Behind this result is the fact that innovation policy has been used as a part of Mexico’s 
political and economic agenda rather than being a competitive business promotion strategy. In 
addition, CONACYT’s lack of empowerment is one of the critical differences between Mexico 
and other countries such as Korea and China.  
Mexico faces the following challenges: i) increase coordination between government 
agencies,(ii) promote linkages among government, academia and the private sector, iii) improve 
program planning by encouraging evaluation and accountability, and iv) align incentives in order 
to increase financial resources available to R&D+I activities, thereby improving Mexico’s 
position vis-à-vis its competitors. 
 
4.10 Recommendations 
The preceding analysis demonstrates the existence of problems of coordination, linkage, 
planning, and insufficient resources. Due to the lack of coordination between agencies and with 
state-level governments, it is difficult to ensure the efficiency and efficacy of public resources 
destined to promote R&D+I. In addition, the lack of coordination implies entrepreneurs have 
little information about the availability of public funding for their projects, which in turn limits 
their incentives to engage in innovation activities. 
Mexico lacks a clear vision and strategy to encourage innovation; there is no consensus 
on what a National Innovation System would look like for the country, both at the national and 
the state level. This is further reflected in CONACYT, which is not a ministry and consequently 
lacks enforcement power over other ministries, state governments or agencies carrying out public 
programs to support innovation. The agency is at a disadvantage and lacks sufficient authority to 
raise funds and promote investment in R&D+I activities.  
Thus, the first recommendation calls for CONACYT to be “upgraded” to ministry level, 
with enough enforcement powers to coordinate the different efforts to support R&D+I 
throughout the country, while making other ministries, agencies and state governments 
accountable and constantly reviewing the effectiveness and efficacy of public programs. With 
planning functions concentrated within a Ministry of Science and Technology, the country could 
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with a national, regional and sectoral vision. That way, projects could be selected based on their 
potential to exploit the country’s competitive advantages at different levels, as opposed to 
continuing project selection based on independent and political priorities. 
Moreover, a Ministry of Science and Technology could potentially reduce the number of 
bureaucratic procedures an entrepreneur or firm must undergo in order to obtain public funding 
for a project. Reducing the time and costs of applying for these programs will create incentives 
to attract private investment for innovation projects. 
Greater coordination among agencies and between the federal and state governments 
could further resolve issues concerning program design, as well as problems with linkages 
between private firms and academic institutions, thereby encouraging optimal levels of 
investment (both public and private) in R&D+I activities. 
 
5.  SME Policy 
 
In most countries, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) make up the bulk of the private 
sector and account for a substantial proportion of the workforce. Mexico is no exception. 
Approximately 99 percent of a total of four million firms are SMEs, accounting for 46 percent of 
GDP and providing 66 of jobs in manufacturing, retail and services (See Figure 6). In addition, 
SMEs account for only 6.7 percent of total exports.  
 






























       Source: INEGI, Censos Económicos, 2004. 
 
The problem is that in Mexico, 90 percent of the approximately 200,000 SMEs created 
every year operate in the informal sector, and by the second year 130,000 (65 percent) will have 
disappeared (World Bank, 2007). The high turnover and the inability of most firms to enter the 
formal sector suggests low productivity levels, which can result from specific constraints or 
market failures to which SMEs are particularly vulnerable, such as inadequate access to finance 
and business support services, weak managerial and workforce skills, imperfect information 
about market opportunities and new technologies and methods of organization. Taken together, 
these constraints result in low product or service quality. In addition, SMEs are 
disproportionately affected by bureaucratic procedures to set up, operate, and grow a business 
(World Bank, 2007, and OECD, 2007b).  
Mexico, like most countries, has put in place a set of programs to support SMEs. 
Government intervention to help SMEs is usually based on their importance for the economy—
their contribution to GDP and employment levels—and the fact that smaller firms tend to be 
more vulnerable to external shocks. In Mexico, the distinction from large firms has to do both 
with a political calculus as well as the fact that SMEs make up the bulk of the country’s firms. 
This study will highlight limited access to competitive financing schemes as well as information 
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failures deserving government attention. Table 10 provides a summary of the following factors. 
 
•  Limited access to competitive finance results from misaligned incentives 
between banks or financial institutions and firms. On one hand, banks are not 
able to correctly assess risks of smaller firms, which often fail to provide—in 
in the banks’ view—sufficient assets as collateral. This implies that banks are 
less willing to lend resources precisely to those firms that need financing the 
most. On the other hand, the monetary and opportunity costs firms face related 
to borrowing from the financial system is so high that they have incentives to 
remain tiny or in the informal sector.   Thus, in a country like Mexico it 
becomes almost impossible to resolve the coordination problem between 
banks and small firms. As a consequence, small firms within the informal 
sector are obligated to seek for resources through informal arrangements 
which are more expensive and risky (in terms of interest rates) than borrowing 
money froman established finance institution. The obvious outcome is that 
entrepreneurs complain about limited access to formal financing, while banks 
argue that lending money to smaller firms is not good business. 
•  Low levels of innovation and internationalization of SMEs. It is important 
for a country to have thriving and innovative firms, especially firms that can 
become part of the country’s export platform and therefore increase the 
country’s competitiveness. Divergence between private and social benefits of 
innovation in small firms could result in the suboptimal number and growth of 
technological firms. In addition, smaller firms endure significant fixed costs in 
surmounting logistical, legal, and cultural barriers to finding new markets, 
particularly abroad. In other words, even productive SMEs devote their 
financial and human resources to their main activity, finding difficulties to 
hire personnel or consulting services that would help them expand their 
consumer base in domestic and international markets, not to mention incurring 
associated logistical and marketing costs as well as those related to expanding 
production. Finally, even though government programs exist to help SMEs 
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Table 10. Market and Government Failures Faced by SMEs 
Failure  Type  Description 
Limited access to 
competitive finance 
Information asymmetry  - Banks and financial institutions are not able 
to correctly assess risk for smaller firms  
Low innovation levels and 
internationalization of SMEs 
Information externality & 
Government failure 
- Divergence between private and social 
benefits of innovation in small firms could 
result in the suboptimal number and growth 
of technological firms 
- Small firms endure significant fixed costs in 
surmounting logistical, legal, and cultural 
barriers to exporting.  
- No one-stop shop (information problems) 
       Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
5.1 Policy Response: The SME Fund  
In 2001 the Government of Mexico created the Under-Secretariat for SMEs within the Ministry 
of Economy. Since then, the strategy focused on enhancing the competitiveness and scope of 
SMEs through training, technology upgrading, consulting and technical assistance in market 
access and internationalization, access to finance through guarantee programs, cluster 
development, insertion into production chains and promotion in trade fairs (OECD, 2007b). The 
Under-Secretariat’s full array of supported programs thus aims at providing assistance through 
all the stages of business development, from inception to internationalization, though not 
necessarily following the same set of firms.  
Prior to the creation of the Under-Secretariat the country lacked a comprehensive policy 
framework for SMEs. The National Development Plan for the period 2001-2006, which included 
the Ministry of Economy’s Entrepreneurial Development Plan, was at the center of the Fox 
Administration’s economic policy. Though results are disappointing, there was an explicit call 
for promoting greater coordination among public programs that had been created before the year 
2000. The spirit of this policy has continued under the administration of President Calderón. 
The main instrument to support SMEs, named Fondo PyME (the SME Fund), was 
created in 2004. The Fund consolidated three programs that had been created in 2001 
(FIDECAP, FAMPYME and FOAFI). The objective of the SME Fund, as stated by the Ministry 
50 of Economy, is to “support the creation and development of micro, small and medium enterprises 
through programs and resources that seek to increase their productivity and competitiveness.”  
In particular, the SME Fund has become the flagship program for both the Fox and 
Calderón administrations to “advance the country’s competitiveness,” the main goal of both of 
their NDPs. More recently, in December 2008, the SME Fund incorporated more funds, which 
until then operated independently in other areas of the Ministry of Economy. In addition to these 
changes, President Calderón also announced at the beginning of 2009 an increase in funding for 
SME programs, particularly those that offer consulting services to firms.  
The first part of the analysis will focus on the operation of the SME Fund as a whole. 
Prior to analyzing one of the programs financed by the Fund, it is important to understand the 
challenges in terms of program design and evaluation that result from the policy’s original 
design, as well as the rules that guide decision-making within the Ministry of Economy. 
The second part of the analysis will focus on accelerator programs, particularly the 
Technology Business Acceleration Program (TechBA). The TechBA program is considered to be 
one of the best designed and operated programs within the SME Fund, as pointed out by external 
evaluations and by the Ministry of Economy itself (UNAM, 2007). 
A Ministry of Economy document from 2001 outlines five sets of problems upon which 
the government initially based its SME policy: 
•  Lack of internationalization of SMEs, which results in low levels of 
competition and therefore few incentives for SMEs to become competitive, 
which is likely the result of the “significant fixed costs each firm must incur to 
surmount logistical, legal, and cultural barriers to exporting” (World Bank, 
2007). 
•  Lack of linkages with most dynamic sectors in the economy, such as the auto, 
electronic, machinery and information and communication technologies. 
•  Limited access to competitive finance, with almost two-thirds of firms 
obtaining financing from non-institutional providers. 
•  Inadequate human resources and managerial capabilities, which leads to the 
disappearance of 65 percent of firms by the second-year of operations 
•  Imperfect information about new, and more productive, technologies, and few 
linkages between business and academia 
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In principle, the SME Fund is designed to meet local needs through subsidies and 
transfers to Intermediary Agencies (IAs)—which can be state governments or independent 
organizations—which are closer to local realities and therefore should be better equipped to 
design effective and relevant programs.  
IAs are therefore responsible for designing, implementing, and providing matching funds 
for different programs, ranging from export promotion to incubation and acceleration, training, 
access to finance, certification, consulting services, feasibility studies, promotion events, and 
supplier development (Ministry of Economy interviews). In addition, state governments must 
sign an agreement with the Under-Secretariat in order to solicit funds, which requires them, at 
least in principle, to align their SME support strategy to that of the Under-Secretariat. State 
governments, through their respective Local Economic Development Offices (SEDECOs) can 
participate in the Directive Council, which is responsible for ultimately approving projects, and 
as IAs, which then choose and evaluate programs proposed to the Directive Council.  
However, interviews with some local government officials revealed that state 
governments have: i) very little information about SMEs in their states, their size, how much 
they produce, etc.; ii) virtually no communication with the private sector; iii) unclear processes 
for designing and implementing their SME programs; iv) erratic programs, changing with each 
administration and usually benefitting firm owners who are close to the administration; v) little 
collaboration with academia and research institutions; vi) virtually no evaluation processes. 
Moreover, the participation of Intermediary Agencies in the process of design and 
implementation of SME programs is positive in principle. In reality, however, a small number of 
IAs control the majority of resources, which could result in rent-seeking. The lack of 
accountability as well as problems with the design of the process and the lack of clear selection 
criteria—IAs have vested interests in the program—often lead to the discretionary allocation of 
funds.  
 
A evaluation published in 2006 by the Auditoría Superior de la Federación (ASF)—
Mexico’s equivalent of the United States’ General Accountability Office—reveals that only 3 
percent of the IAs registered within the Ministry of Economy to design and implement programs 
spent 87 percent of the SME Fund’s budget for that year. Another evalution published by the 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) for the 2007 period also highlighted fund 
concentration in a small number of IAs, with 13 of them spending 72 percent of the budget. In 
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benefited large firms such as Bombardier in Querétaro and General Motors in San Luis Potosí.  
Finally, programs financed by the SME Fund suffer from an inadequate design of 
performance indicators, which makes it difficult for the Ministry of Economy as well as external 
evaluators to correctly assess the programs’ impact on firms’ productivity and competitiveness, 
as stated in the Fund’s mission statement. Benchmarks for measuring effectiveness do not lead to 
an increase in productivity. Criteria for measuring the SME Fund effectiveness within the Under- 
Secretariat for SMEs includes number of jobs created or jobs kept without indicators that can 
actually measure productivity growth, or the actual effect of the SME Fund on changes in SMEs 
over time. 
 
5.2 The TechBA Program 
 
In theory, accelerator programs respond to the coordination failure described above, whereby 
smaller firms that innovate will bring positive externalities to the economy by introducing more 
dynamism, but which face various difficulties in the process of introducing innovative products 
into the market as well as accessing markets abroad.  
TechBA was created in 2004 by the Mexican Foundation for Science (FUMEC) with 
funds from the Mexican government. The first objective of the program was to select the fastest- 
growing technology-based Mexican SMEs and help them compete in international markets. In 
addition to traditional export promotion services, TechBA offered these firms access to financial, 
business, and technological resources from the most innovative regions in the world. 
Specifically, TechBA established operations in Silicon Valley, California; Austin, Texas;   
Montreal, Quebec; and Madrid, Spain.  
The idea is for companies to send representatives, preferably high-level decision makers, 
to one of TechBA’s offices abroad where they are provided with a space to operate, consulting 
services, and the opportunity to interact face-to-face with local firms, financial institutions and 
other organizations. For companies to access these services, they must undergo a selection 
process, which used to begin with a “convocatoria” organized by the Ministry of Economy but 
now essentially takes place year-round. TechBA selects the cities and regions where it will 
solicit projects based on their prior knowledge of existing capabilities in that city or region.  
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and international experts in business, technology, and venture capital select the best candidates 
based on the following factors: i) quality of the management  team, ii) product or service 
differentiation in terms of its technological relevance, iii) knowledge of the market, iv) quality of 
their business strategy, and v) financial position of the company for the previous two years. If 
selected, firms are invited to participate in a “pre-acceleration” process, which begins with a 
half-day event where they receive guidance on how technology businesses are conducted in 
international markets and also have the opportunity to have one-on-one interviews with 
TechBA’s staff to validate their proposals. Proposals undergo a further round of evaluations and 
the whole process is completed in three to four months before selected firms can send 
representatives to one of TechBA’s offices abroad.  
Unlike an incubator, which helps entrepreneurs survive during the start-up period, a 
business accelerator such as TechBA helps SMEs which already have an innovative product or 
service in hand to overcome the difficulties to access global markets. Thus, the second objective 
of the program is for companies to contribute to the economic development of their regions once 
they complete the process. Since participating companies are selected by TechBA from “regions 
of innovation”—places where TechBA determines an opportunity for the development of 
innovative clusters in the present or future—TechBA sees cluster development and regional 
innovation as the ultimate goal of the program. 
 
5.3 Institutional Capacities within the Ministry of Economy and IAs 
For the fiscal year 2007, the SME Fund accounted for 95 percent of all available funds to the 
Under-ecretariat for SMEs, and its budget has steadily increased from an initial budget of US 
$106 million to approximately US $300 million in 2008. To understand the magnitude and 
impact these funds could have on the country’s SMEs, consider there are more than four million 
micro-, small- and medium-sized firms in Mexico. If the SME Fund were to be distributed 
among all of them, it would amount to about US $1,800 per firm, which hardly sounds like a 
sufficient amount to help these firms overcome the variety of obstacles they face. In reality, for 
the 2006 (2007) period the SME Fund served close to 160,000 firms, which amounts to 2 percent 
of the total number of firms in the country. Moreover, close to half of the firms reported by the 
Ministry of Economy as beneficiaries are firms that attended events like Semana PyME, which is 
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Ministry’s programs.  
The inability of the Ministry of Economy to reach a substantial amount of the country’s 
total firms reflects both budget constraints and opposing incentives that derive from the SME 
Fund’s design. The Under-Secretariat for SMEs is responsible for establishing the guidelines for 
design of local programs but at the same time depends on those programs’ ability to meet 
specific goals to sustain its funding from Congress. Thus, the Under-Secretariat has incentives 
to: i) receive increasingly larger budget allocations from Congress, and therefore spend it all; and 
ii) set basic goals, such as number of firms served, as their primary indicator of success. In 
practice, only a few IAs (in 2006, 3 percent of the total registered) receive and spend more than 
80 percent of the SME Fund budget (UNAM, 2007).  
The TechBA case helps draw some conclusions about the incentives IAs face in the fund 
allocation and program design process. TechBA receives a budgetary allocation from the SME 
Fund, which has grown at an annual rate of over 35 percent since 2005, reaching approximately 
US$ 4.7 million in 2007 (http://www.fondopyme.gob.mx/#). In order to obtain funds, TechBA 
submits a budget proposal to the Under-Secretariat for SMEs, based on their estimate of project 
cost multiplied by the number of firms they plan to serve in a particular year. Since funds are 
allocated based on a specific budget proposal that aims to serve a precise number of firms (an 
indicator required by the Under-Secretariat for SMEs), TechBA only has an incentive to attend 
firms without necessarily evaluating the quality of its impact on the firm or on regional 
development once the firm completes the process. Indicators for measuring effectiveness are not 
well designed, and there is no system in place to constantly evaluate the impact of programs 
financed by the SME Fund on supported firms and on the economy. 
Additionally, TechBA seems to be providing a service companies value, as take-up rates 
for the program increase year by year along with the budget. However, given the focus of the 
process on “serving firms” rather than creating impact, it is not clear whether TechBA will ever 
have an incentive to become operational on its own, especially given that the SME Fund does not 
include a sunset clause for IAs. Interviews with government officials, firm owners and personnel 
from various IAs revealed that the lack of sunset clauses for programs operated by IAs tends to 
create perverse incentives. In many instances these agencies are heavily dependent on transfers 
from the SME Fund for survival. This dependency, combined with the lack of real monitoring 
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that do not necessarily have an impact on firm productivity and competitiveness. Table 11 
provides a summary of the roles and incentives for each actor. 
 
Table 11. Roles and Incentives in SME Programs 
Institution  Roles  Incentives 
Under-Secretariat for 
SMEs  
- Design Rules of Operation and 
Manual of Procedures for SME 
Fund application 
- Receive larger budget allocations 
for SME Fund 
- Heads Directive Council which 
approves or rejects projects 
- Set goals prioritizing number of 
supported firms and allocation of 
entire budget in order to maintain 
funding levels year after year. 
- Approves Intermediary Agencies 
which design and implement SME 
programs 
  





- Design and operate programs such 
as incubators, accelerators, export 
promotion agencies, etc. 
- Some IAs are heavily dependent 
on these transfers for survival 
which reduces incentives to create 
programs based on impact. 
- Can be public, private, academia    
TechBA  - Design and operate accelerator 
programs 
- Without a sunset clause for IAs, 
TechBA has incentives to remain a 
government-sponsored program 
rather than evaluating the 
opportunity for selling its services 
- Choose participating companies 
from “regions of innovation” 
  
       Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
5.4 Response to Market Failures 
SME policy in Mexico is not necessarily designed to respond to market failures. Rather, the 
policy seems to be motivated by a combination of realizing SMEs had never been supported as a 
sector before 2001 and the political returns this kind of support can yields.  Some of the 
programs are designed to meet specific market failures, such as the guarantee programs and 
some of the training programs offered to SME personnel. However, the overall policy does not 
consider differences among sectors, regions and size of firms that can somehow induce 
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on the existence of market or government failures. 
TechBA provides an example of a program that in principle is designed to correct a 
market information failure. However, the program’s design does not make this justification 
explicit. Additionally, TechBA is apparently responding to market needs. Perhaps there is a real 
need for this service and, while accelerators might actually solve a market failure for smaller 
firms wishing to penetrate technology markets, there might be an opportunity for the private 
sector to pay for some of these services. Further evaluation of the program and its contribution to 
firms’ productivity is needed. 
 
5.5 Effectiveness of the SME Fund and the TechBA Program 
The SME Fund evaluation published by the Auditoría Superior de la Federación in March 2008 
highlights the following results for the 2006 period:  
 
•  The SME policy did not contribute to the main objective of the NDP 2001-
2006 to “Increase and Extend Competitiveness” since Mexico’s position in the 
WEF rankings fell 16 places from 2001 (when it ranked 42
nd) to 2006 (when it 
ranked 58
th).  
•  The Under-Secretariat for SMEs does not have an evaluation system in place 
to measure the efficacy and technical and economic efficiency of the 
programs implemented under the SME Fund. 
•  Control and supervision mechanisms for the SME Fund are nonexistent. 
Accountability of implementing agencies is deficient, and the Ministry of 
Economy has not applied legal and administrative sanctions to implementing 
agencies that have not met program objectives. 
•  Indicators measure process and activities (creation of new firms, employment 
generated, firms that now export, firms integrated to productive chains, and 
granted microcredits) but do not measure technical and economic efficiency, 
quality or social impact, even though providing such indicators is required by 
law.  
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funds are reported as “Subsidies and Transfers”—with 98 percent for the SME 
Fund. 
•  Only 2.9 percent of the IAs registered with Secretaría de Economía spent 86.8 
percent of the resources available for the SME Fund. 
•  Only one of the SME policy’s six objectives was met during the 2001-2006 
period: the number of “supported” firms reached the desired level. However, 
the SME Fund fell short of increasing the production value of SMEs, reducing 
value of imports as a percentage of GDP, increasing the use of domestic 
inputs for export production, creating sufficient productive employment (in 
fact unemployment rates increased during this period), or consolidating 
support networks for SMEs across all states in the country.  
 
As for TechBA, between 2005 and 2008, TechBA has registered 350 beneficiaries. 
However, according to TechBA staff interviewed for this project, it is too soon to evaluate the 
program’s effectiveness in firms’ performance as well as in the development of regional 
innovation systems as a result of returning companies’ efforts. TechBA’s website 
(http://www.techbasv.com/) offers the following results for the 2005-2008 period:  
 
•  Companies have secured investment or closed deals for around US$ 28.36 million. 
•  48 companies have incorporated in the United States. 
•  High-value direct jobs created by supported firms following their affiliation with 
TechBA represent 8 percent of those firms’ total employment.  
•  Companies’ income related to each new job is US$ 70,000. 
 
There is no specific evaluation of the TechBA program. The SME Fund does not require 
its IAs to submit detailed expenditure reports, and when impact evaluations measure SME 
programs they focus on the fund itself rather than IAs. With that caveat in mind, interviews with 
TechBA staff, Ministry of Economy officials and some firm owners enabled us to draw a few 
conclusions and cautionary points: 
•  Accelerators supported by the SME Fund, including TechBA, submit their 
budget proposals based on an estimate of their own costs of each project 
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process and the lack of accountability create incentives for increasing budget 
allocations without undergoing a cost-benefit analysis of the public resource’s 
impact. 
•  In order to undertake further evaluations, indicators of program effectiveness 
should shift from “number of firms served”—which creates incentives for 
increasing budgets without necessarily increasing impact—to more value-
driven indicators. 
•  One of TechBA’s goals is to ensure that firms that complete the program help 
develop the regions of Mexico in which they are located. However, there is no 
indication—judging from interviews with TechBA’s staff—that the follow-up 
process necessary to determine regional impact of firms’ increased 
productivity is taking place. 
 
5.6 Recommendations 
SMEs are highly varied in nature, they operate across very different sectors of the economy and 
the conditions they face tend to reflect their local realities. Most of them are not competitive; 
though they constitute almost the entirety of the country’s firms, they account for only a little 
over half of the country’s production. Less than 10 percent of them are able to export and prove 
their competitiveness in international markets.  
These firms face a variety of obstacles that large firms do not. One is limited access to 
competitive finance, and another is their inability to innovate and internationalize. Though SMEs 
in part lack competitiveness due to their internal deficiencies, the business environment in which 
Mexican firms operate is cumbersome and costly, therefore magnifying existing market failures. 
The government’s response has had little to do with addressing such market failures. Instead, the 
main policy instrument to serve firms’ needs, the SME Fund, is plagued with problems of design 
and implementation.  
The first recommendation thus seeks to address design problems within the SME Fund. 
The Rules of Operation published each year by the Ministry of Economy do not provide clear 
enough guidelines to encourage Intermediary Agencies to design their programs based on 
existing market failures. Including clear selection criteria within the Rules of Operation should 
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granting greater discretion over selection to IAs, which often results in rent-seeking or leads to 
SME programs serving large firms. In addition, IAs which are not fully accountable to the 
Ministry of Economy should be required to undertake impact evaluations and set credible goals 
for improving firm productivity.  
Secondly, the Ministry of Economy should establish more specific impact indicators in 
its guidelines before even disbursing resources to IAs. Though the lack of specific goals 
responds in part to the rules behind program design and monitoring on the part of the 
Comptroller, it is crucial for the programs’ success to have indicators based on their impact on  
firm productivity—the policy’s original objective.  
Finally, interviews with local officials revealed ongoing talks between the National 
Statistics Office (INEGI) and state governments in order to improve data collection for SMEs. In 
reality, though, SME policy is actually enacted at the local level, and state offices often lack the 
most basic data about the number of SMEs in their locality and the sectors in which they operate. 
Thus, a third recommendation is directed at the Ministry of Economy to accelerate negotiations 
on data collection efforts between INEGI and state authorities. 
 
6.  The IT Sector: PROSOFT 
 
The information technology (IT) sector in Mexico
7 represents about 3.1 percent of total GDP, 
compared to 5.3 percent of Latin America’s total GDP, 7.1 percent of GDP for high-income 
countries, and 8.8 percent of GDP for the United States (World Bank, 2006). Despite this lag, in 
Mexico the industry has grown significantly, recently posting 15 percent growth over seven 
years.  In 2007, Mexico’s IT sector produced a total of US$ 4.1 billion, up from US$ 2 billion in 
2000, and is expected to reach production of US$5 billion in 2008 (Secretaría de Economía, 
2007). Moreover, since the IT sector was liberalized in the early 1990s, exports have grown 
eightfold from US$ 100 to US$ 800 million in 2008 (Zavala, 2008).  
As a result of this takeoff, Mexico has gained credibility as a provider of software and IT 
services in international markets. AT Kearny ranks Mexico as the tenth-best global service 
location among the top 50 offshoring destinations (AT Kearney, 2007). In addition, the country 
 
                                                        
7 Includes software development and packaging, IT services and offshoring and Business Process Outsourcing  
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provider for Latin American countries.  
However, to take advantage of the country’s strengths, firms in the Mexican IT sector 
must tackle a variety of external and internal challenges that limit their growth. The market 
failures faced by firms in innovative sectors such as IT are listed below. See Table 12 at the end 
of this subsection for a summary of the following issues: 
 
•  Low levels of innovation, resulting from information failures: facing 
increased competition from countries with relative lower costs in simpler 
outsourcing activities, in order to remain competitive Mexico needs to figure 
out how to move into higher value-added services in the IT sector. However, 
given that the benefits to society of discovering these opportunities are higher 
than those for the private sector, the upgrade in productive capacities might 
never take place without some intervention from the government to support 
innovation activities. 
•  Limited access to competitive finance: as a result of information 
asymmetries between financial institutions and small- and medium-sized IT 
companies, firms often have trouble meeting the requirements to obtain loans. 
Interviews with firms of all sizes as well as with government officials revealed 
that the IT industry lacks adequate financing. Many firms in the IT sector are 
very small and highly inefficient, and as a result lack the ability to access 
competitive financing for their activities. However, it seems that firms in the 
IT sector face greater financing constraints than in other sectors, basically 
because they cannot provide physical collateral for their loans, as their main 
asset is in human capital. A study by the World Bank (2008) indicates that on 
average, financing for working capital in the IT sector amounts to 14.4 percent 
while for other service sectors it reaches 22.2 percent.  
 
•  Missing public inputs: telecommunications infrastructure development is 
very low throughout the country, and limited access to this kind of 
infrastructure presents an obstacle to firms in the IT sector. Moreover, in the 
case of Mexico, the monopoly structure of the telecommunications sector 
further exacerbates this problem, since the social benefits of investing in 
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Additinally, the current regulatory structure and political considerations 
within the telecommunications sector in Mexico have made it difficult for 
governments to build or rent additional networks.  
•  Low availability of qualified human capital, resulting from information 
asymmetries: due in part to a lack of coordination between the private sector 
and academia, which given the rapid process of technological cjamge in the 
industry can often remain behind in their curricula. Mexico’s low educational 
levels affect the industry’s ability to find readily available human capital to 
satisfy its needs. Firms often complain about not finding enough trained 
personnel to hire, and university graduates often complain about not finding 
work. IT companies claim to spend up to US$60,000 for a period of 18 
months to train each new engineer, usually needing specialized courses and 
English-language training. In addition, several studies indicate there are 
neither enough network and computer technicians nor enough high-quality 
managers in information technology SMEs (World Bank 2008).  
 
There is a caveat, however, to this assertion. An analysis of the majors chosen by 
university students since 1978 reveals that by 2003 the number of students graduating with 
Computing and Systems Engineering degrees had grown from 50,000 to over 200,000 graduates, 
as shown in Figure 10 below. In this sense, firms’ frequent complaint regarding the lack of  
qualified personnel to hire could result from the existence of an information asymmetry in which 
firms are unable to correctly assess the quality of new graduates in Computer and Systems 
Engineering. It could also be that, even though the number of graduates on the subject has 
quadrupled over the last 30, it is still insufficient to meet industry needs. 
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Failure  Type  Description 
Low levels of 
innovation 
Information externality  - Benefits to society of 
discovering these opportunities 
are higher than those for the 
private sector; the upgrade in 
productive capacities might 
never take place. 
Low availability of 
qualified human 
capital 
Information asymmetry  - Low levels of coordination 
between firms and academia can 
result in suboptimal levels of 
qualified personnel for the 
industry. 
Limited access to 
competitive finance 
Information asymmetry  - Human capital remains an 
inadequate collateral for 
obtaining loans, which limits 
individuals’ access to credit for 
pursuing further training. 





Missing public inputs & 
Government failure: 
monopoly structure of the 
telecommunications 
industry 
- Social benefits for providing 
telecommunications 
infrastructure throughout the 
country are higher than the 
private benefits of doing so for 
companies. 
- For the case of Mexico, the 
monopoly structure of the 
telecommunications sector 
further exacerbates this problem.
- Obstacles in forming 
“clusters,” which imply constant 
and effective collaboration 
among firms and with academia 
and can encourage a virtuous 
cycle of innovation. 
       Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
6.1 The Now-Defunct PROSOFT Program 
In 2001, the Fox Administration’s National Development Plan deemed the Information 
Technologies (IT) industry “strategic”due to its “transverse effect on the entire economy, [and] 
its [potential] positive impact on competitiveness for all sectors” (NDP 2001-2006). In order to 
take advantage of Mexico’s proximity to the US, cultural affinity and extensive trade network to 
become a leader in the global IT industry, the Ministry of the Economy in coordination with 
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The basis for this policy response, at least in name, boiled down to one theme that cut across the 
Fox team’s economic policies: to increase competitiveness.  
Therefore, PROSOFT, coordinated by the Ministry of Economy, represented a grouping 
of PDPs geared towards improving and promoting the IT sector’s competitiveness both at home 
and abroad. Up until 2008, PROSOFT was managed by the Under-Secretariat for Industry and 
Commerce within the Ministry of Economy. However, during restructuring plans for the 
Ministry that took place early in 2009, the PROSOFT Fund was absorbed by the Under-
Secretariat for SMEs under the SME Fund.  
Despite this caveat, it is important to consider the PROSOFT Program’s design process in 
order to identify potential lessons for programs operating under the SME Fund. Some 
components of PROSOFT were designed to respond to identified market failures, though others 
catered to needs reported by firms and industry associations. Though not necessarily negative, 
responding to firms’ needs might draw the program away from its objectives and result in 
spending on activities that could potentially be provided by the market without government 
support. 
PROSOFT’s design process deserves special attention. It was one of the few sectoral 
programs that from the beginning systematically integrated private sector stakeholders into the 
negotiations in order to help determine the program’s goals and objectives. There is no public 
documentation available to perform a thorough analysis of these negotiations. However, there is 
a document developed by AMITI (the Mexican IT Industry Association), which makes specific 
recommendations for strengthening the IT sector and which served as the basis for PROSOFT’s 
design (see Table 13). 
 
64 Table 13. Instruments Proposed by AMITI (2001) and Actual Elements of PROSOFT 
Instrument  Proposal AMITI  PROSOFT 
Financing 
Angel capital program        
Seed capital program   X  X 
Venture capital program  X  X 
Guarantees program  X  X 
Subsidies     X 
Human Resources 
Training  X  X 
Certification  X  X 
Technology Quality Centers for software products  X    
Private sector integration with academic 
institutions  
  
X  -       Curricula    
-       Teaching methods    
-       Specialization     
English-language learning     X 
Business Services 
Legal advice for international contracts  X    
Promotion in international markets (including 
diagnostics and coaching through process) 
X  X 
Promotion of IT sector in domestic market     X 
Creation of IT Parks and EPZs  X    
Regulation       
Regulatory framework for the industry  X  X 
Fiscal recognition for “Integrator Firms”   X    
Entrepreneurship       
Encouraging firms to specialize      X 
Encouraging firms to develop of hubs and firm 
groupings 
   X 
Source: AMITI (2001) and PROSOFT 2.0, Secretaría de Economía (2007). 
 
Interviews with current and former public officials as well as industry representatives 
were helpful understanding the process.  The Ministry of Economy coordinated working groups 
that included public officials, industry associations, and members of academia. At this stage, 
state governments did not participate in the design process. Instead, once the program was 
established they were encouraged to align their own objectives for IT firms in their states with 
those proposed by PROSOFT.  
This first process lasted a little over a year, upon which the resulting strategy outlined 
specific objectives in a 10-year framework, spanning from the end of 2002 to 2013. It was the 
65 first time a program of this kind established mid- and long-term goals. The program was set to 
operate through the proposed PROSOFT Fund, but Congress did not earmark funds for the 
program until 2004, two years after it had been established.  
In 2007, the program underwent a thorough review by the Ministry in conjunction with 
the same industry associations and academic organizations who had previously participated in 
the design of the program. Interested state governments also participated. Once again, working 
groups were convened in order to re-evaluate the direction of the program, its objectives and new 
components. As a result, PROSOFT 2.0 was born.  
The need to reevaluate the program came with the arrival of a new administration. The 
new government decided to maintain several of the former government’s economic policies, 
including support for certain industries like software, based on their potential to advance the 
country’s competitiveness. However, the industry had evolved and the focus on software was no 
longer considered relevant. Thus, the working groups that reconvened in 2007 decided to expand 
the program’s focus from software to include IT services and business process outsourcing 
(BPO). The new objective became to “create the necessary conditions for Mexico to have an IT 
services industry that is internationally competitive and has long-term growth prospects, as well 
as to promote IT use in productive processes across the economy” (PROSOFT 2.0, Ministry of 
Economy). Table 14 below shows the changes from PROSOFT to PROSOFT 2.0. 
66  
Table 14. Changes from PROSOFT to PROSOFT 2.0 
PROSOFT  PROSOFT 2.0 
Main Objective 
Create the necessary conditions for Mexico to have 
a software industry that is internationally 
competitive and has long-term growth prospects.  
Create the necessary conditions for Mexico to have 
an IT services industry that is internationally 
competitive and has long-term growth prospects, as 
well as to promote IT use in productive processes 
across the economy. 
Main Goals 
- Achieve annual production of US$ 5 billion;   - Achieve annual production of US$ 15 billion; 
- Increase expenditures on IT to reach world 
average;  
- Create 625,000 jobs in IT sector; 
- Become the leading software Spanish digital 
content development in Latin America. 
- Increase expenditures on IT to reach an average of 
2.3%; 
   - Become industry leader in Latin America. 
Activities  
- Export promotion and investment attraction  - Global market: exports and FDI  
- Education  - Human capital: increase quantity and quality of 
talent in software and IT services development 
- Legal framework for the industry  - Legal framework for the industry 
- Development of local markets  - IT diffusion: promote use of IT services in local 
market 
- Strengthening of local industry   - Local industry and clusters: increase firm 
competitiveness and promote cluster creation 
- Adoption of internationally recognized processes  - Quality: encourage firms to reach international 
levels of certification 
- Physical and telecommunications infrastructure 
development 
- Financing: increase financing options and 
resources (Fondo PROSOFT) 
       Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
The 10-year vision adopted in 2002 provided not only long-term goals, giving a degree of 
certainty to firms in the industry, but also an opportunity to revise the program halfway through 
the process.  The main changes brought about in PROSOFT 2.0 include a commitment to help 
firms achieve sustained growth levels through consultancy and coaching services, an emphasis 
on certification of employees and firms to improve their credentials in international markets and 
new forms of financing.  
Prior to the 2007 revision, the PROSOFT Fund was synonymous with the policy. Since 
2007 the Ministry of Economy has attempted to emphasize that the Fund is just one of the policy 
instruments used to support the sector, as the Fund operated through subsidies, credit lines for 
specific firms, and risk or seed capital for new firms in the industry.  
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firms that either produce IT services and software or need support adopting information 
technologies. It targeted individuals, firms, industry associations, non-governmental 
organizations, academic institutions, entrepreneurs, and IT users. 
State governments and sometimes industry associations such as CANIETI and AMITI, 
acting as Intermediary Agencies (IAs), were in charge of reviewing the first round of 
applications responding to the the “convocatoria” (which took place twice per year). These 
entities selected beneficiaries based on a thorough application and then made recommendations 
about potential beneficiaries to the program’s Board of Directors, which was composed of public 
officials from the Ministry of Economy. The Board then evaluated each case and selected 
beneficiaries from applications meeting the following criteria:  
 
•  Generate and keep formal employment opportunities; 
•  Increase competitiveness in IT sector firms; 
•  Denote project’s technical, commercial, economic, and financial viability; 
•  Contribute to regional economic and sustainable development; 
•  Establish or strengthen incubators of software and related services; 
•  Contribute to the development of an entrepreneurial culture in the IT sector; 
•  Strengthen human resources and processes used by firms in the IT industry; 
•  Is aligned with the action-goals determined by PROSOFT; 
•  Integrate IT firms into the market and into production chains; 
•  Generate improvements in productivity and competitiveness in IT sector firms. 
 
Once they were approved, beneficiaries could receive subsidies for up to 50 percent of 
the value of their projects. In general, 25 percent was provided by the federal government and 25 
percent by the state governments. The remaining 50 percent had to be provided by the firm. 
Projects with a training and/or certification component specifically for microenterprises could 
receive up to 70 percent of their funding from PROSOFT. In essence, PROSOFT followed a 
similar program design and implementation process to the SME Fund, where IAs design and  
operate programs as well as contribute matching funds.  
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Fund allocation to PROSOFT followed the same process as that of other earmarked government 
expenditures. In this case, the Ministry of Economy presented a budget proposal, including 
earmarked funds for PROSOFT, which then became part of the Executive’s budget proposal to 
Congress. Once in the hands of the legislature, the Chamber of Deputies negotiated adjustments 
to the whole budget and presented a final version to the Senate, which then had to approve it.  
Table 15 below shows funds earmarked for PROSFOT from 2004 to 2008. Despite the 
increase in funding for the program, interviews with both Ministry of Economy officials and 
firms revealed complaints that the amounts given for the PROSOFT program were still not 
enough to help boost the industry. On the other hand, conversations with legislators who have 
supported earmarking funds for PROSOFT revealed that even when they found the program 
useful for firms in the IT sector, they were skeptical of how much “bang for their buck” they 
were getting every time they voted to increase the program’s monetary allocation. In fact, the 
lack of evaluations ex ante and ex post is a recurrent problem for most government programs, 
and PROSOFT was no exception. For the first time, in 2008 PROSOFT presented its evaluation 
framework, with indicators ranging from jobs created to investments by firms and state 
governments to industry growth. 
In addition to budget allocations, the Ministry of Economy reported that IAs and firms 
through their matching contributions together practically tripled funds provided by PROSOFT. 
From 2004 to 2007 investment from the PROSOFT Fund amounted to $4,145 million pesos—28 
percent from the Fund itself, 16 percent from state governments, and 55.3 percent from firms, 
academia and other participants (Ministry of Economy, 2007).  
 
Table 15. PROSOFT’s Budget Allocation 2004-2008 





2004  10.4  - 
2005  12.3  18% 
2006  33.0  168% 
2007  35.6  8% 
2008  50.0  40% 
                                            Source: Ministry of Economy. 
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Both the process of initial design and the 2007 revision demonstrate willingness on the 
part of the Under-Secretariat for Industry and Commerce to adapt the PROSOFT program to 
identified industry needs. While some parts of the program do reflect existing market failures, 
identifying them was never the focus of the design process. In addition, the Under-Secretariat 
faced similar incentives as those described for other entities throughout the study. In order to 
receive more funding each year, and taking into account that any unmet commitments could 
result in legal actions against public officials, they had incentives to focus program goals on 
operational issues. As such, indicators for success included reaching a particular number of 
beneficiaries or raising a certain amount of matching funds as opposed to focusing on the 
program’s impact on firm productivity and competitiveness.  
Perhaps the incorporation of the PROSOFT Fund into the SME Fund makes sense from a 
coordination perspective. Throughout this study, there is evidence of lack of coordination within 
and among Ministries as well as duplication of programs and activities. Thus, merging the Funds 
makes sense in principle. 
However, interviews with public officials from the Ministry of Economy revealed this 
process has not been easy, nor has it seemed to respond to coordination concerns. The SME Fund 
is plagued with problems of design and implementation and, while the PROSOFT Fund also 
faced some of these problems, it was designed closer to beneficiaries’ needs. Ideally, SME Fund 
operators would incorporate not only the Fund’s but also the program’s best practices. According 
to interviewed officials, this does not seem to be the case so far.  
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Table 16. Roles and Incentives within PROSOFT 
Stakeholder  Role  Incentives 
Under-Secretariat for 
Industry and Commerce  
- Design Rules of Operation and 
Manual of Procedures for PROSOFT 
and oversight 
- Receive increasingly larger budget 
allocations for PROSOFT operation 
- Heads Board of Directors which 
approves or rejects projects 
- Set goals for Fund operation, 
focusing on number of beneficiaries 
and number of jobs created 
- Approves Intermediary Agencies 
which design and implement 
PROSOFT programs 
  
- Coordinate members of industry, 
academia and the public sector to 
discuss changes to the program 
  
Under-Secretariat for 
SMEs (in the future 
Enterprise Development) 
- Operate SME Fund  - Receive increasingly larger budget 
allocations 
·  Not negotiate with former PROSOFT 
operator to maintain program’s 
operative record  
Industry Associations  - Provide up-to-date industry 
information  
- Receive budget allocations for 
program operation 
- Guide design process based on 
industry needs 
- Benefit member firms 
State governments that act 
as IAs 
- Intermediaries in selection of 
beneficiaries, adopting the rules of 
operation of PROSOFT 2.0 
- Receive budget allocations for 
program operation 
- Attend to local constituent needs  
       Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
 
6.3 Outcomes   
The Ministry of Economy outlines a number of positive outcomes of PROSOFT’s first phase: 
 
•  International positioning of Mexico as a country with capacities to develop 
technology-based products and as an outsourcing destination. Gartner recently 
classified Mexico as the second choice, just behind Ireland, for IT service 
outsourcing (Ministry of Economy, 2007). 
•  Certification of 56 firms in MoPROSOFT, a locally designed norm that 
meets international standards, as well as Capability Maturity Model 
Integration (CMMI) process. In 2002, only four firms had this certification. 
•  The creation of 24 IT clusters and 17 integrators focused on improving local 
competitiveness and firm productivity.  
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•  The existence of abundant talent for IT services. According to a McKinsey 
study, which designates Mexico as having the world’s ninth-largest reserve of 
human resources for IT services, the country has approximately 550,000 
professionals currently working in IT services delivery, integrating 
approximately another 65,000 per year into the labor force.  
•  Legal reforms have been promoted to increase demand for IT services as well 
as to expand electronic purchases through the use of electronic firms and 
certifications. 
•  Inclusion of PROSOFT’s strategy in development plans for 30 states 
across Mexico. This means that states are not only receiving federal funds 
from the program but also contribute funds themselves for the development of 
IT projects in their entities. 
•  Identification of 8 IT parks. 
 
The software and IT sector’s increased growth in the last few years indicate there is an 
opportunity for Mexico to become a leading provider and service location. The government has 
taken an active approach in the promotion and strengthening of firms in the sector since 2002. 
Partly as a result of PROSOFT and the programs implemented within it, Mexico has been able to 
position itself strategically.  
An external evaluation performed by UNAM (2007) outlines the following results: 
 
•  Design: even though the program has correctly identified the problems faced 
by the industry, they found problems with the indicators set out for the project 
as well as with their means of verification means.  
•  Strategic planning: the short- and mid-term strategies were correctly 
designed and match the goals and objectives of the program. However, there 
is no long-term strategy since current legal requirements do not call for long-
term planning. 
•  Coverage and Focalization: coverage at the state level is adequate and the 
program was found to be well focused. 
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for supports and the efficiency of application processing are congruent with 
the legal requirements. In addition, the evaluation found satisfactory results 
with respect to efficiency in resource allocation, process improvements, 
adequate organization and adequate financial planning.  
•  Perception of target population: beneficiaries are found in general to have a 
positive perception of the program. The evaluation points out that PROSOFT 
itself has no means to measure satisfaction levels of program beneficiaries. 
•  Results:  the program collects adequate information to monitor its 
performance as well as progress towards the program’s goals and objectives.  
 
6.4 Response to Market Failures 
The policy is adequately designed to attend to the challenges faced by firms in the sector, though 
not necessarily to respond to relevant market failures. It seems that collaboration between the 
government, the private sector and academia has been well established, but there are no tangible 
measures of the impact of this coordination, at least as reported by relevant institutions and 
stakeholders.  
Finally, the PROSOFT Fund seemed to face obstacles similar to those of the SME Fund. 
Funds were disbursed from the Ministry of Economy to IAs that evaluated and chose potential 
projects, causing potential conflicts of interest. In the case of PROSOFT it seemed that the 
Ministry was able to guarantee a certain degree of homogeneity regarding the support strategies 
of state governments and IAs. However, there was very little accountability of local governments 
and IAs, and a complete lack of impact evaluation procedures to measure the program’s 
effectiveness. 
 
6.5 Recommendations  
 
All in all, the PROSOFT program was a relatively well-designed program. The Under-Secretariat 
for Industry and Commerce showed institutional capacity for renewal, as demonstrated by the 
changes included in the 2007 revision. However, it is no longer clear whether this can be 
maintained under the merged SME Fund. It is important to keep in mind the following caveats in 
order to avoid similar mistakes in the design of new programs under the SME Fund, including 
the following: 
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•  While some of the program’s components are designed to respond to market 
failures, such as the training component and the provision of international 
certifications for firms, identifying and attacking market failures was not 
necessarily the focus of the program.  
•  The program was originally designed as a response to software industry 
lobbying. In fact, PROSOFT’s first version is based almost in its entirety on 
the AMITI document published a few months before the program became 
operational. The dialogue between the private sector and the government is 
positive. However, there was not any form of evaluation ex-ante to determine 
what kind of resources provided by the public sector could in fact have the 
most impact on firms.  
•  Despite the Ministry of Economy’s emphasis that the PROSOFT Fund was 
only one part of the program, the two were in fact synonymous. The Fund 
served a channel for subsidies from the Ministry to IAs, in a similar manner 
the SME Fund subsidizes IAs, facing also many of the same conflicts of 
interest. 
•  Conversations with legislators revealed that, despite their overall positive 
regard for the program, they were not convinced of the impact these funds are 
having on the competitiveness of firms in the sector. Though they would not 
necessarily oppose funding the neither PROSOFT nor the SME Fund –it is 
politically attractive after all– their voiced concerns indicates the design and 
implementation process certainly deserves further monitoring and evaluation. 
 
Indicators were used to measure progress in process and activities (job creation, increase 
in sales for the whole sector, etc.) and were not adequate to measure actual impact on 
beneficiaries. The Ministry of Economy claims that since PROSOFT began, the software and IT 
sector started growing at a faster pace than before the program’s existence. However, this claim 
is hardly an indication of the direct effect of the program on firms, as a number of external 
factors could have been responsible for this growth. 
74 7.  FDI in the Aerospace Sector 
 
The aerospace sector
8 was designated one of Mexico’s strategic sectors during the 2000-2006 
administration of Vicente Fox (PND 2001-2006). Given Mexico’s strong record in the electronic, 
metal-mechanical, and automotive industries, aeronautics and aerospace are probably natural 
developments for the country’s manufacturing base.  
Over the past 10 years, the aerospace industry has been in the process of reorganizing 
operations, becoming increasingly more like the automotive industry where global supply chains 
are the norm. The industry’s restructuring has been brought about by a variety of factors, 
including the following: i) the events of September 11, 2001 and the decline in global travel that 
had begun even before that date; ii) the privatization of some state-owned companies; iii) the 
increased market share of low-cost airlines; iv) new government purchasing policies; v) new 
players such as Embraer from Brazil; and vi) companies’ desire to restructure their onerous labor 
arrangements. These circumstances led companies to become more profit-oriented, bringing a 
whole new area of opportunities for countries that could host some segment of the production 
process at a lower cost.  
Several factors make Mexico a relatively good strategic location for global firms in the 
industry and enable it to take advantage of this new industry conformation. Its geography, its 
border with the United States, its property rights protection (strong compared to China), and the 
evolution of the maquiladoras, the electronic sector, and the automotive sector have been 
determinant factors in making Mexico an attractive destination for offshoring certain processes 
of aerospace-related production. 
 
ones they could potentially ap
                                                       
Establishing an aerospace industry, however, which is a new activity for Mexico, 
represents challenges for both local and foreign firms in terms of finding out which processes 
Mexico can excel at and become increasingly more productive. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) 
describe this phenomenon as “self-discovery” externalities, whereby the learning process of a 
country’s firms implies huge risks that they are not necessarily willing or ready to undertake, 
given that the social benefits of innovating and moving on to new activities are higher than the 
propriate. As such, governments can choose to intervene not only 
 
8 The difference between aerospace and aeronautics is that the former includes devices that can operate outside the 
atmosphere of the Earth. In Mexico, the industry is basically referred to as aeronautics, which encompasses from 
R&D to manufacture, operation and service. However, because the government refers to the industry as aerospace, 
we decided to do the same in this section. 
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large repercussions in the productive structure of the country in the future. 
Justification for government intervention in the aerospace industry is usually compared in 
Mexico to PDPs for supporting the auto industry. It is true that policies to promote the auto 
industry were developed in the context of a closed economy, one very different from the current 
economic context of globalization. However, over the years PDPs for the automotive industry 
have evolved and most importantly have helped Mexico become a global player, even if 
challenges remain in promoting local value-added and developing local firms so they can 
integrate into global value chains. The recognized success of PDPs implemented to support the 
auto industry suggests there is some room for public intervention to encourage the development 
of the aerospace industry, particularly in terms of ensuring positive conditions for investment 
attraction, such as the following (which are summarized in Table 17):  
 
•  The provision of missing public goods: The private benefit of providing 
these goods and services is low compared to the social returns. In the absence 
of decentralized incentives and mechanisms for making accurate decisions in 
terms of providing and investing in socially beneficial infrastructure, sectors 
such as aerospace face difficulties in providing airport and customs 
infrastructure at a pace that matches the industry’s needs and growth rates.  
•  Low availability of qualified human capital for further complicated 
processes: low coordination levels between the private sector and academia, 
as well as the still slim and often nonexistent connection among research 
institutions, universities, and the private sector in Mexico, results in a limited 
pool of high-skilled workers necessary to scale up the sector’s activities in the 
long run.  
•  Positive externalities of FDI from the aerospace industry: these include 
demonstration effects, whereby local firms can adapt technologies introduced 
by MNCs; labor mobitliy, which encourages the transfer of skills from MNCs 
to local firms; and vertical supply chain integration, through which local 
suppliers can receive technology transfers from the MNCs to which they sell 
their products. 
76 •  Lack of coordination in FDI attraction policies at the federal and state 
levels: The federal and state governments design policies to attract investment 
for the aerospace almost independently of each other. There is very little 
coordination between the two levels of government and among state 
governments in order to increase the development potential of their regions. 
This results from a failure on the part of government to define a standardized 
FDI attraction policy. 
 
Table 17. Market and Government Failures for the Aerospace Sector 
 
Failure  Type  Description 




- Social benefits for providing 
infrastructure throughout the 
country are higher than the private 
benefits of doing so for 
companies. 
Low availability of qualified 
human capital 
Coordination failure  - Low levels of coordination 
between firms and academia can 
result in suboptimal levels of 






- So far, local supplier 
development has failed to take 
place. 
Lack of coordination at state 
and federal levels 
Government failure  - Results from a failure on the part 
of government to define a 
standardized FDI attraction policy.
       Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
 
7.1 Federal and State Policies for Attracting FDI into the Aerospace Sector 
 
For the case of the aerospace industry in Mexico, it is likely that border states such as Baja 
California, Nuevo León, Chihuahua, and Sonora—where most of the country’s maquila industry 
is located—would become attractive locations for incoming firms. Figure 11 demonstrates this is 
certainly the case for border states. In addition, Querétaro, which is located in Mexico’s central 
region and is close to states with high automotive activity, has captured 6 percent of firms 
operating in the country.  


























                        Source: Producen (2007). 
 
Much has been said regarding the continuity between the automotive and the aerospace 
industry (see Table 18 below for a summary).  Indeed, while there are important differences 
between the aerospace and the automotive industry, in the case of Mexico one can conclude that 
the automotive industry was an important predecessor. Many companies in Baja California, for 
example, have stated that they are involved with both the automotive and the aerospace 
industries. In addition, decades of success in the automotive industry led Mexico to develop 
important human capital, supply chain management capabilities and the ability of local 
governments to attract investments and create a reputation that is important in an industry where 
quality, coordination, and safety are the main concern (AT Kearney, 2003).   
The beginning of Bombardier’s operations in Mexico represent another example of the 
importance of installed capacity in the auto and electric-electronic industries.  Bombardier 
established its first plant in Mexico in the late 1990s, producing harnesses and cables for its 
planes (Producen 2007), manufacturing with which Mexico already had experience because of 
the presence of the automotive sector. In addition, interviews revealed that Mexico provides 
logistical advantages for aerospace firms such as having engineers and managers who already 
understand how to deal with providers and participate in global value chains, and state 
governments with experience attracting and supporting, through different instruments, large 
plants in their states. Finally, just as the existence of auto and electronic industries generated 
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value chain in the aerospace sector can produce positive externalities for other industries as well. 
 
Table 18. Differences and Similarities: Auto and Aerospace 
Differences  Similarities 
Complexity. A car has 7,000 parts while an 
airplane has 6 million.  
Its assembly is highly complex. It requires 
supply chain management capabilities.  
Automakers have higher production volumes, 
providing more chances to implement 
improvements. 
Products can be broken down fairly easily 
into modules and systems (related to 
electronics, mechatronics and mechanics).  
Horse power in an airplane is dramatically 
higher.  
Small number of manufacturers that rely on 
many suppliers.  
Cycle times are shorter in the automotive 
industry (product life in the automotive 
industry is 3 to 6 years versus 25 in an 
airplane) 
Companies have to choose in between 
becoming system integrators or pursue 
opportunities as indirect suppliers. Integrators 
assume responsibility for all technical tasks.   
Historically there has been a strong 
relationship in between the aerospace 
industry and tgovernments.  
  
                 Source: AT Kearney (2003). 
 
So far, the industry consists mostly of the manufacture of parts and components (77 
percent).  A small part is dedicated to repairs and maintenance (13 percent), and only a few 
companies, accounting for the remaining 10 percent, focus on engineering and design Consejo 
Mexicano de Educación Aeroespacial (Comea). Even if the most complex processes are not yet 
being implemented in Mexico, however, when compared to other economic sectors within the 
country, the aerospace industry stands out for its sophistication, potential for value-added, and 
synergy with other industries and thus deserves attention in terms of government intervention to 
solve general market failures.  
While aerospace companies that first arrived in Mexico produced only small components 
in labor-intensive, high-volume production activities, lately these activities have shifted towards 
more complex ones. To take only example, a plane has six million parts, and the industry is 
unusual in the sense that integrator firms such as Boeing and Bombardier do not design the 
planes on their own. Instead, they require participation from every supplier that ever participates 
in the process, therefore creating the potential for Mexican suppliers to become increasingly 
integrated into the design process. This also entails that suppliers must acquire the highest 
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which implies an expensive process and can often discriminate against incoming supplier firms.  
Although aerospace has been a designated strategic sector since 2001, it is not clear 
whether this means anything in terms of policymaking or the aerospace sector’s operations. In 
practice, according to interviews with officials from the Ministry of Economy as well as former 
state-level ministers of Economy, the sector was selected as strategic when the government 
perceived global industry leaders’ interest in Mexico. The efforts to promote Mexico as a hub for 
the aerospace sector were in fact led by one person from the Under-Secretariat for Industry and 
Commerce at the Ministry of Economy. Then, in 2006, when ProMéxico was created, the agency 
took charge of promotion activities for the sector.  
In theory, ProMéxico is the agency responsible for establishing goals to promote the 
aerospace sector and coordinate state-level efforts in order to encourage optimal levels of 
investment. During the current administration (2006-2012) of President Felipe Calderón, 
ProMéxico has set objectives regarding representation at international fairs and industry events 
by well-trained, professional staff who spoke on behalf of nationwide industries and not just in 
favor of specific states—which occurred whenever state governments sent their own 
representatives to such events (Ministry of Economy, 2007). In practice, however, states still 
send their own representatives to international fairs to promote their entities without necessarily 
coordinating either with ProMéxico or with other states.  
FDI attraction policies, however, still lack standardization. The federal government does 
not offer fiscal incentives unless, as stated by the Ministry of Finance, investments exceed US$ 
500 million. In fact, Mexico has never undertaken a policy of offering fiscal incentives at the 
federal level.  
In turn, the federal government through the Ministry of Economy has used other 
instruments to support firms in the aerospace sector. In particular, the Ministry was responsible 
for dropping all customs duties on aerospace components, something that was not done from the 
beginning for the auto and electronics industries. Through the SME Fund it is also possible to 
support large companies that establish supplier development programs for local firms. In fact, 
companies like Bombardier do receive support from the SME Fund (www.fondopyme.gob.mx). 
One policy which seems relevant and solves an information problem for the industry, 
therefore contributing to effective promotion, is the certification program put in place by the 
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obtaining approval was the Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA), which allows 
procedures in Mexico to be certified within the country instead of in the United States (Hunt and 
Greene, 2005). Though it seems minor, solving and information problem of this sort should go a 
long way in increasing the local industry’s competitiveness. Unfortunately, very little 
information was available regarding the process by which these negotiations took place so as to 
determine whether the Ministry had identified a potential market failure and was willing to solve 
it.  
Even though Mexico has 30 states, the options for investing in any particular industry 
narrow down to only a few, depending. States in Mexico vary widely in terms of services, 
location, infrastructure and qualified workforce availability. For example, the state of Michoacan 
has received large amounts of FDI thanks to its port, while Chihuahua, Nuevo León and Baja 
California enjoy the geographical advantage of being close to the US. Other states, such as 
Estado de México, Querétaro and Puebla highly benefit from being in the center of the country 
and from their proximity to Mexico City.  
For some state governments, particularly those in border states, the aerospace sector 
seems a natural continuation of their industrial development. For others, such as the case of 
Querétaro, Bombardier would probably not have established operations there had it not been for 
that state government’s efforts to attract the company. This section outlines Queretaro’s efforts in 
this regard.  
State governments compete to attract investment by offering various incentives to foreign 
investors. Those states that set aerospace as a priority sector are offering various forms of 
assistance, including: (i) fiscal incentives in the form of exemptions from property taxes as well 
as granting real estate at little or no cost; (ii) funding for high technology companies, through 
their budget allocations from the SME and CONACYT funds; (iii) investment in training and in 
new or upgraded educational and research institutions; (iv) assistance in recruiting staff, as well 
as dealing with legal and administrative matters; (v) infrastructure development, such as airports 
and highways;  and (vi) discounts for public services such as water and electricity. 
The case of Bombardier in Querétaro is illustrative because they received one of the 
largest incentive packages given by local governments for the industry. Benefits reported by 
Bombardier itself include:  
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•  US$ 7 million of investment for the Querétaro airport 
•  Government investments in supplier development programs for the industry 
•  Free services (water, electricity, gas, and water) 
•  A US$ 50 million investment to create the Universidad Tecnológica del 
Estado de Querétaro (UTEQ) specifically focusing on aerospace engineering 
and related subjects 
 
In principle, three out of these four benefits seem to respond to existing market failures: 
provision of public goods, positive externalities of encouraging technology transfer, and solving 
coordination issues to increase human capital availability. It is also worth noting that in this case 
Bombardier responded well to Queretaro’s efforts. For the new universities, the company hired 
the first six professors for the university and collaborated with the university’s management in 
the elaboration of curricula. Another successful case of collaboration comes from Honeywell 
which established operations in Baja California and developed a division responsible for training 
suppliers in Latin America in Monterrey, the Aerospace Electronic Systems (AES) site location 
(Hualde and Carrillo, 2007).  
Still missing from the whole process, however, is a formal ex ante cost-benefit evaluation 
of the potential impact of these incentives on the state or even the regional economy. Interviews 
revealed that, given states’ limited capacity to raise revenues—and therefore grant substantial 
benefits to companies—a race-to-the-bottom phenomenon seems to be taking place regarding 
state-level FDI attraction policies. 
 
7.2 Institutional Capacities 
In general, PDPs for aerospace—even though it is considered a strategic sector—remain 
fragmented. There is no national level strategy to find and encourage synergies between states in 
order to ensure optimal levels of investment. Instead, a multiplicity of actors and instruments are 
used during the process without any evaluation of whether incentives and support mechanisms 
are necessary for the industry.  
According to interviewed state-level and Ministry officials, states have developed a race-
to-the-bottom game when it comes to investment attraction. In this game, investors have more 
complete information than states, and due to the lack of internal coordination on the part of the 
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probably not give out without a careful cost-benefit analysis. Thus, it is a game of perverse 
incentives where states privilege new flows over potentializing existing investments by ensuring 
technology transfer to local firms and developing a business base.  
At the federal level, ProMéxico has set specific objectives for the sector regarding 
investment amounts and origin. Thus, the agency should be the natural institutional choice for 
coordinating federal and state efforts in attracting investment for the aerospace sector. However, 
interviews with ProMéxico officials and state government representatives indicate a lack of both 
information and institutional empowerment. ProMéxico does reach out to states in order to 
obtain their catalogues of potential exports as well as the incentives they are willing to provide 
for new investors. However, states usually do not have this information up to date. In addition, 
they are unwilling to provide existing information to the federal agency, fearing their strategy 
will be outperformed by another state, which could ultimately coerce ProMéxico into revealing 
their information. While there is no clear evidence of this process, however, these are the 
perceptions of interviewed government officials. In sum, ProMéxico does not seem to be solving 
the coordination problems that exist among states as well as between states and the federal 
government (see Table 19 for a summary of institutional capacities). 
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Table 19. Institutional Roles and Limitations in the Aerospace Sector 
 
Stakeholder  Function  Limitation 
Ministry of Economy  - Coordinate design and implementation 
of PDPs for the aerospace sector,  though 
not necessarily in practice 
- Stating goals and metrics is not an 
obligation and, if not achieved, can have 
legal consequences. This limits having 
clear goals.  
- Does not have a clear way to select 
sector (strategic) and evaluate policy 
needs 
ProMéxico  - Attract investments. Represent Mexico 
abroad.  
- Because investments take place at a 
local level, many states are not willing to 
collaborate with ProMéxico, especially if 
the party governing the state is not from 
the same party that the executive power 
is.  
- Obtain and Provide up-to-date industry 
information  
- States are competing against each other; 
they do not want to share information 
with the government at a federal level. 
- Guide design process based on industry 
needs 
  
- Also, coordinate design and policy 
goals  
  
- Coordinate state governments’ 
initiatives to support the sector 
  
Universities  - Public universities such as the 
Politecnico have an incentive to prepare 
students for this industry. However, they 
do not obtain all the funds they require.  
- Public Universities lack funds. The best 
programs are in Mexico City and most of 
the aerospace industry is in the north. 
- Private universities such as the 
Tecnologico de Monterrey see an 
opportunity; however, it has been 
difficult to recruit teachers that specialize 
in the sector.  
- Coordination problems exist 
particularly regarding the lack of 
capacities within universities to obtain 
information from the private sector  
   - The process of adapting university 
curricula tends to be too slow and is 
often outpaced by the industry’s progress 
State governments  - Attract investments. Give benefits to 
the companies. Regarding taxes, the 
property, and services such as water.  
- They have limited information 
regarding what other governments are 
offering. The risk of offering more 
benefits than the optimal level is high.  
       Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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7.3 Response to Market Failures 
At the federal level, policies to attract investment in the aerospace sector and encourage 
development of this new activity, while fragmented, do tend to respond to existing market 
failures—even if those policies do not always derive from a conscious identification process. 
Providing public inputs and certification definitely help to provide certainty for investors. Other 
programs, like coordination at the state level and promotion activities, seem to serve as a second-
best solution to an original government failure to standardize FDI attraction policies and laws. 
At the state level, some of the implemented policies also make sense in principle, 
particularly those that seek to solve the coordination failure between the private sector and 
academia. Others, like offering fiscal incentives, can also solve some uncertainties for investors. 
Yet, as noted above, the process for deciding which incentives to offer does not include a 
thorough cost-benefit analysis, nor does it imply a process for identifying existing market 
failures. 
 
7.4 Effectiveness of Policies to Attract FDI at the Federal and State Levels 
The Mexican Aerospace Industry has gained enormous relevance in the past 10 years. However, 
much more coordination will be needed for the industry to begin to move toward higher-value 
activities.  
In interviews with public officials at the federal level, there did not seem to exist any 
clear information regarding their goals and how they plan to pursue them. There is a clearer 
strategy at a state level—though not without its caveats—particularly in states such as Querétaro, 
which recently attracted Bombardier, and Baja California, where almost a third of the industry 
operates. At the federal level, ProMéxico and state governments lack incentives to establish of 
clear goals and measure results.  
Regarding infrastructure, federal resources have traditionally been allocated particularly 
for highways, while airports are often—and erroneously—not seen as a trigger of economic 
activity. Therefore, efforts remain isolated instead of taking part in a more general strategy aimed 
at connecting aviation activity (airports) with highways and the development of the aerospace 
industry itself. As a result, the effectiveness of policies to provide infrastructure, as well as 
training and linkages with universities, is reduced due to the non-existence of a global strategy. 
85 States operate on their own and in competition with each other, and it is not clear that states and 
the federal government are collaborating in a coordinated way. 
Finally, members of academia interviewed for this project claim that their research in the 
aerospace sector is not being used to strengthen the industry; collaboration between academia 
and the private sector coordinated by the government remains very low. They claim that if there 
is not a connection in between research and the sector Mexico will not be able to giver higher 
value to the industry and manufacturing versus design will prevail.  
 
7.5 Recommendations 
So far, the aerospace sector sees to have developed without much need for government 
intervention, attracting large amounts of FDI and growing at a relatively quick pace year after 
year. However, given Mexico’s competitive advantages (location, certification, related 
industries, costs), it remains important for the government to tackle existing market failures in 
order to allow the industry to develop further.  
Designating a sector as “strategic” could reflect an effort to focus government programs 
on fast-growing industries that have the potential to contribute to the country’s development. 
However, it seems this categorization of sectors within the National Development Plan does not 
entail any particular strategy for the industries thus identified. Instead, what remains is a 
collection of disorganized programs and initiatives that often result in misuse of existing funds—
such as the use of the SME Fund by large MNCs in the aerospace sector—or in a race to the 
bottom where states offer all sorts of incentives without necessarily evaluating their impact on 
the state or region. 
Certain recommendations follow from the analysis: 
 
•    Develop a mechanism to perform ex ante and ex post cost-benefit 
evaluations whereby ProMéxico can determine, along with interested states, 
the impact of benefits used to attract FDI on the whole economy (at a state, 
regional, and national level). Interviews with officials from the Ministry of 
Economy and ProMéxico indicate that a process to define criteria for cost-
benefit evaluations is taking place. However, there is no evidence that this sort 
of mechanism is being applied so far. In particular, this process should take 
into account the existence of market failures. 
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categorization seems to be done randomly, taking into account the opinion of 
entrepreneurs and a few experts but without a thourough analysis of the 
reasons behind it or what the classification entails in terms of public policy. 
•   Provide ProMéxico with enough faculties to enforce a national-level FDI 
attraction strategy. ProMéxico is a new agency, created by the current 
administration to take charge of FDI attraction and export promotion 
activities. It is modeled after successful insitutions like ProChile; yet, so far it 
has failed to live up to its expectations. The agency’s inability to coordinate 
agendas with the Ministry of Economy (upon which it depends) and with 
states and other agencies for the development of its main goals, limit its scope 
and impact. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
Mexico has the potential to grow at accelerated rates. However, economic growth for the past 
three decades has remained low. Neither openness nor macroeconomic stability has proved 
sufficient to promote productivity increases in the country’s firms. Mexico has liberalized its 
economy and achieved macroeconomic stability, two key conditions for firms to remain 
competitive. However, microeconomic conditions are still deficient: multiple non-trade barriers 
remain an obstacle to take full advantage of commercial treaties, while the country’s regulatory 
framework has failed to create the correct incentives for entrepreneurship to take off and inject 
dynamism into the economy.  
Out of the eight strategic sector sectors identified by the National Development Plan, this 
study focused on the IT services and aerospace sectors, given their potential for helping Mexico 
to scale up the production ladder. In addition, the analysis focused on PDPs targeting SMEs, 
R&D and innovation activities and training.  
For each of these areas there are market failures that justify government intervention, 
ranging from missing public inputs, to externalities, to information asymmetries and 
coordination failures. Table 20 below provides a typology of market failures for the sectors 
analyzed throughout the study.  
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Market Failure  Training  R&D + 
Innovation 





X        X  X 
Coordination failures  X  X        X 
Information 
asymmetries 
X  X  X       
Missing public 
inputs 
         X  X 
       Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
In addition, most of these sectors also face government failures that might justify 
intervention, even when these interventions can only serve as second-best policy choices. These 
range from a low-quality educational system, to poor protection of intellectual property rights, to 
poorly designed regulation, to lack of coordination across government agencies.  
None of the programs analyzed throughout this study are designed based on a careful 
analysis of existing market or government failures. Moreover, when they do their effectiveness is 
questionable and hard to measure. Instead, programs seem to be designed to respond to 
alternative goals, such as social and budgetary objectives and industry demands. In addition, 
none of the programs analyzed perform impact evaluations, while some even lack data about 
beneficiaries that could allow them to monitor programs effectively. Finally, all programs suffer 
from a misalignment of incentives. Sometimes program design creates perverse incentives for 
program operators and beneficiaries, such as the cases of training, SMEs and PROSOFT. For 
other programs, it is the lack of coordination between and among agencies, which results in poor 
planning and even race-to-the-bottom attitudes, especially among states.  
Below are general conclusions and recommendations for each of the sectors and 
programs analyzed. 
 
8.1 Training and the BECATE Program  
In Mexico government spending (6.4 percent of GDP in 2004) and coverage of the national 
education system have dramatically increased in the past few decades, going from 4.5 years of 
education in 1976 to 8.2 years in 2006 (OECD,2007a). Yet only a minority of the population has 
completed secondary school, and even fewer have completed higher levels. Training programs 
alone will not solve this situation but can make important contributions. Careful analysis of one 
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objectives (responding to a market failure) and what the program actually does in practice. In 
addition, it is not clear that, due to the population’s low skill levels, firm-specific training 
programs solve these failures.  
The following recommendations are made for BECATE: 
 
•  Re-evaluate BECATE’s stated objectives. Program goals create incentives 
for individuals to game the system and access the program several times 
without being turned down. BECATE seems to be compensating for the lack 
of unemployment insurance instead of focusing on its stated objectives, which 
have more to do with improving skills and reducing transaction costs.  
•  One-shot impact evaluation of skills attained through the program. 
Though the need for it seems obvious, this type of evaluation does not take 
place. In fact, program indicators of success do not include “improvement in 
skills”—though this is difficult to measure—but rather focus on placement 
rates, even when the program’s stated objective is to increase human capital.  
•  The self-employment mode should disappear. It is not clear whether the 
abilities microentrepeneurs obtain through BECATE actually increase their 
employability, especially since the program is not specialized in creating 
sustainable microfirms. The Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry 
of Economy are better suited to addressing microenterprise needs.  
•  Transform the program to offer general rather than specialized skills. 
The deadweight loss to society from not providing individuals wth general 
skills is sufficiently high to transfer money to a program that only seeks to 
reduce the transaction costs created by rigid labor laws. An alternative would 
provide individuals with more general skills that they can transfer across 
companies. 
 
8.2 Innovation and Research and Development 
As a middle income country, Mexico needs “efficiency enhancers” in order to boost its growth 
substantially and head towards an innovation stage of development (Porter, 2003). Investment in 
R&D and innovation is low in Mexico, however, signaling problems of access to competitive 
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center for science and technology policy, exists since 1970 to promote scientific and 
technological development through training high-level researchers and implementing research 
programs in specific areas, but this organization alone cannot compensate for constraints 
elsewhere in the operating environment.  Industries that should act as leverages for innovation 
development, such as energy, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, are severely restricted either 
by legal constraints or by lack of both physical and human capital. Investment levels, both by the 
public and private sectors, remain well below the regional and OECD averages. The lack of an 
innovation policy framework for the country renders CONACYT’s efforts mostly ineffective.  
Some recommendations follow from this analysis: 
 
•  Upgrade CONACYT to Ministry level. With planning functions 
concentrated in a Ministry of Science and Technology, the country could 
formalize its NIS, identifying priorities and development opportunities in 
innovation projects with a national, regional and sectoral vision.  
•  Revise program goals to address current market failures. 
•  Reduce number of bureacuratic procedures for the AVANCE program. 
Reducing the time and costs of applying for these programs will create 
incentives to attract private investment for innovation projects. 
•  Induce greater coordination among agencies and between the federal and 
state governments. Greater coordination could further resolve issues 
concerning program design, as well as problems with linkages between 
private firms and academic institutions, thereby encouraging optimal levels of 
investment (both public and private) in R&D+I activities. 
 
8.3 SME Policy, Now Including PROSOFT Funds 
The main instrument to support SMEs is Fondo PyME (the SME Fund), which was created in 
2004. For Fiscal Year 2007, the SME Fund accounted for 95 percent of all available funds to the 
Under-Secretariat for SMEs. The Fund deals only with local governments and intermediary 
organizations (public or private institutions) and offers no direct funds to SMEs. Programs 
supported by the fund tackle a number of activities which include export promotion, incubation 
and acceleration, training, access to finance, certification, consulting services, studies and events. 
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organization, they have design shortcomings, selection criteria are nonexistent or deficient, and 
the benchmarks for measuring success do not lead to an increase in productivity. In fact, success 
in the SME Fund is measured according to the number of jobs created or kept and not according 
to productivity indicators, even the causal relationship is, to say the least, difficult to imply). The 
analysis of TechBA, though helpful to understand how a well-designed program can be 
potentially beneficial, also coincided with many of the criticisms for the SME Fund, including 
lack of accountability and a failure to measure impact. 
Recommendations include the following: 
 
•  Revise selection criteria in Rules of Operation. Currently, selection criteria 
for beneficiaries remain vague, therefore granting greater discretion over 
selection to IAs, which often results in rent-seeking or leads to situations in 
which SME programs assist large firms. Currently, guidelines and selection 
criteria do not entail a technical analysis of the market failures faced by small 
and medium-sized firms. In addition, IAs which are not fully accountable to 
the Ministry of Economy should be required to undertake impact evaluations 
and set credible goals for improving firms’ productivity and competitiveness. 
•  Establish specific impact indicators focused on increasing firm 
productivity and competitiveness. Indicators are currently set to measure 
progress in process and activities (job creation, increase in sales for the whole 
sector, etc.) and do not serve to measure actual impact on beneficiaries. 
Though the lack of specific goals results in part from the Comptroller’s rules 
on program design and monitoring, the success of programs depends on 
selecting indicators according to how much impact they have on firm 
productivity—the policy’s original objective. 
 
•  Improve data collection on SMEs at the local level. While Most SME 
policy is actually enacted at the local level. Yet, state offices often lack the 
most basic data about the number of SMEs in their locality and the sectors in 
which they operate. Thus, a third recommendation is directed at the Ministry 
of Economy to accelerate negotiations on data collection efforts between 
INEGI—the national statistics agency—and state authorities. 
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constant dialogue with private sector representatives. In order to better 
identify and tackle market failures and issues firms face. Valuable lessons can 
be adopted from the process PROSOFT followed to establish its goals and 
objectives, taking care not to overemphasize firm concerns without a thorough 
technical evaluation. 
•  Undertake impact evaluations and replace progress indicators. Interviews 
with decision-makers revealed that, despite their overall positive regard for 
SME programs, they were not convinced of the impact these funds are having 
on the competitiveness of firms.    
 
8.4 FDI in the Aerospace Sector 
Policies addressing the manufacturing sector, particularly maquiladoras and especially 
companies in the automotive industry, have paved the way to develop higher-level industries 
such as in aerospace sector, which is intensive in technological innovation and promises to 
become one of the highest growing in the country. Clusters for the automotive industry have 
created virtuous growth cycles and numerous business and job opportunities, produced a skilled 
workforce, and set up the basic infrastructure to move on to higher value-added activities. 
However, PDPs for the manufacturing sector have failed to i) spur the the creation of a more 
sophisticated labor force and ii) develop innovative and highly specialized local suppliers in 
order to enhance the sector’s economic spillovers. More than 40 years after the first PDPs for 
this sector were implemented, domestic suppliers provide less than 4 percent of the 
maquiladoras’ inputs (Baz, 2008).  Essentially, local producers have not been able to compete 
with global suppliers for even a small fraction of the market. The aerospace industry could face a 
similar fate if PDPs are not correctly targeted and adopt the lessons learned from the maquila and 
automotive industries. The following recommendations are thus made for this sector:  
 
•  Develop a mechanism to perform ex ante and ex post cost-benefit 
evaluations whereby ProMéxico can determine, along with interested states, 
the impact of benefits used to attract FDI on the whole economy (at the state, 
regional, and national level).  
92 •  Develop specific criteria for designting “strategic” sectors. Currently this 
categorization seems to be made randomly, taking into account the opinion of 
entrepreneurs and a few experts but without a thorough analysis of the 
underlying reasons or what the classification entails in terms of public policy. 
•  Provide ProMéxico with the resources it needs to implent a national-level 
FDI attraction strategy. The agency’s inability to coordinate agendas with 
the Ministry of Economy—upon which it depends—and with states and other 
agencies for the development of its main goals, limits its scope and impact. 
 
In conclusion, there is no consensus on the development path Mexico wants to follow, or 
on what it needs to do in order to achieve specific goals. As a result, PDPs are often incongruent 
with each other, redundant and uncoordinated. The PDPs analyzed throughout this study provide 
evidence of the kind of redundancies and inefficiencies in program design and application that 
result from the lack of consensus regarding the country’s development path. In addition, none of 
the programs analyzed during this study have well-established accountability mechanisms, which 
makes it difficult for stakeholders, such as members of civil society and Congress—to evaluate 
the impact of PDPs on the country’s productive structure, a recurrent problem in the PDPs 
analyzed for this project. 
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